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The Erie Doctrine in Equity
John T. Cross"
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York' is best known as the Supreme Court's first
attempt to demarcate the line between "substance" and "procedure" for purposes
of applying the rule in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.' York held that because a state
statute of limitations was a matter of substance, a federal court adjudicating a claim
arising under the law of that state must apply state law rather than federal law.
Recognizing that the terms substance and procedure are mere labels, the York Court
analyzed the question in light of the purpose of Erie, which was to ensure
uniformity in result between federal and state courts.' York's "outcome determina-
tive" test,4 as refined by the Court over the past fifty years, remains a cornerstone
of the Erie doctrine.
But there is another facet of the York opinion that although largely overlooked,
is of equal importance. Notwithstanding its constitutional overtones, Erie can be
understood as a reinterpretation of the Rules of Decision Act,' rejecting the narrow
reading of that Act set out in Swif? v. Tyson.' Until 1948, application of the Act
was explicitly confined to "trials at common law."7 York, however, was an action
in equity.! Therefore, if Erie is based solely on the Rules of Decision Act, the rule
announced by the Court would not apply to the state law at issue in York. Although
it recognized the limiting language of the Rules of Decision Act, the York majority
declared that the statute did not create new law. Rather, its command to follow
state law was "merely declaratory of what would in any event have governed the
federal courts and therefore was equally applicable to equity suits."' It was this
basic principle, not merely the Rules of Decision Act, that required federal courts
to honor state-law substantive rights. York therefore strongly reinforced the
intimation in Erie that the rule is constitutionally compelled.10
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I. 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
2. 304 U.S. 64,58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
3. Erie, 326 U.S. at 109,65 S. Ct. at 1470.
4. Id.
5. The original Rules of Decision Act was set out in the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, ch. 20, I
Stat. 92 (1789). The statute is codified in its current form at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842).
7. In 1948, the Rules of Decision Act was amended by replacing "trials at common law" with
the term "civil actions." "An Act To revise, codigy, and enact into law title 28 of the United States
Code, Entitled 'Judicial Code and Judiciary,"' ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
8. The suit involved a claim by the beneficiary of a trust against the trustee, a matter within the
traditional jurisdiction of equity. York, 326 U.S. at 100-01, 65 S. Ct. at 1465-66.
9. Id. at 103-04,65 S. Ct. at 1467.
10. The Erie Court itself indicated that the decision was based at least in part upon the
Constitution. 304 U.S. at 77-78, 58 S. Ct. at 822.
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Yet, although York extended Erie to equity, Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion did not entirely dismiss the notion that equity is different. In dictum, he
suggested that federal courts could often diverge from state law in equity,
especially on questions of remedy." His opinion listed in detail the scope of, and
limitations on, the federal law of equity." Because Justice Frankfurter never
clearly explained where the federal courts derive this special prerogative in equity,
this part of the York opinion is difficult to square with the basic principle of limited
federal judicial authority set out in the remainder of the opinion.
As analysis of the Erie doctrine has matured over the years, courts and
commentators have quite naturally questioned whether York's dictum concerning
federal equity is good law. After all, the remedy that a court grants is the
"outcome" of a case. Therefore, if a federal court may provide different remedies
than a state court hearing the same claim, the difference in laws would clearly be
outcome-determinative, and would inevitably lead to forum-shopping. Several
courts and commentators have accordingly concluded that a federal court
adjudicating a state-law claim must defer to state law on all issues of remedy, even
if the underlying claim is equitable.'3
This article explores this largely overlooked side of the Erie doctrine. The
central thesis is that the York majority was correct when it suggested an equity
exception to Erie. In fact, there are two distinct equity exceptions. First, when the
underlying substantive right is created by Congress, federal courts will ordinarily
apply a uniform federal judge-made rule governing remedies and other equitable
issues. This first exception is merely a variation on a well-recognized exception
to Erie, and is therefore largely non-controversial.
Second, federal courts hearing claims arising under either state or federal law
have considerable discretion to diverge from state rules dealing with issues of
equitable procedure, remedies, and defenses, regardless of whether applying a
different rule would change the outcome of the case. This second conclusion is
considerably more controversial. It is certainly at odds with the leading commenta-
tors, who have rejected a general equity exception to Erie in cases arising under
state law.'" These commentators argue that equitable remedies cannot qualify as
rules of procedure under the current test used to evaluate procedural rules.
Although that conclusion is undeniably correct, it does not resolve the matter. The
procedural rules discussed in Hanna v. Plumer's are but one of several types of
valid federal judge-made law. A complete analysis of whether federal judge-made
rules of equity are valid should also ask whether equity falls into one of these other
categories.
Part II of the article explores the realm of substantive federal judge-made law.
That analysis provides a firm footing for the first equity exception, under which a
federal court may craft equity rules when adjudicating a primary right created by
11. 326 U.S. at 105-06, 65 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
12. Id.
13. See infra cases and commentary cited in notes 127 to 137.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 134 to 138.
15. 380 U.S. 460,85S. Ct. 1136(1965).
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Congress.' 6 However, none of the existing categories of substantive federal judge-
made law applies to equity cases involving state-law claims. Each of those
categories involves considerations of federalism that will ordinarily not be present
when a federal court in equity hears a state-law claim or defense.
Nevertheless, the analysis of substantive federal judge-made law in Part II
ultimately reveals a new way to deal with the basic problem. Reasoning from the
insights gleaned from a general analysis of federal judge-made law, Part III
demonstrates that equity is a separate, sui generis area in which federal courts have
the power to make law. The federal courts derive the authority to craft a separate
body of federal equity law from the Constitution itself. More specifically, the
Article III judicial power includes the authority to exercise the type of
discretion practiced by courts of equity in the late eighteenth century. As
long as that exercise of discretion does not result in the creation of new
substantive rights or the abolition of existing rights, it falls within a federal
court's inherent constitutional authority. Therefore, all federal judge-made
rules that deal with how a court should exercise its equitable discretion in
enforcing a right are valid, and may be applied by a federal court in lieu
of state law.
Part IV of the Article briefly fleshes out some of the details of the two "equity
exceptions" to Erie. The only limits on the first exception are the Constitution and
the will of Congress. Although federal judicial authority is narrower under the
second exception, it is still much more expansive than the current commentary
would suggest. Most significantly, a federal court's lawmaking power is not
limited to the question of equitable remedies. Equity involves not only remedies,
but also unique causes of action and defenses. Part IV explores the extent to which
Erie requires a federal court to follow state law governing this myriad of matters.
It concludes that although federal courts hearing state-law claims do retain
considerable power to employ equitable procedural devices and defenses, they must
generally follow state-law rules defining equitable causes of action.
Before embarking on the analysis, however, a few notes on terminology are in
order. Erie analysis quite often uses the term "federal common law." The meaning
of "common law" has changed over the past century. Today, the term is a
shorthand way of referring to all law that stems from judicial precedent rather than
legislatures. But historically that term had a more precise meaning, denoting one
particular court in the multi-court English system. Because the historical
distinctions between common law and equity are crucial to the analysis that
follows, this article will use the term common law in its historical sense to refer
both to the common-law court system and to the body of rules applied in those
courts. The less common, but more accurate term "judge-made law" will refer to
all rules established by precedent, whether in common law or equity. On the other
hand, "law" and "legal" are not used for their historical meanings, in which they
16. See infra text accompanying notes 167 to 177.
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referred only to common law, but instead mean all binding rules, regardless of the
court system in which that rule is applied. Although this convention may prove
clumsy at times, it prevents the ambiguities that can arise from imprecise
terminology.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE LAW iN FEDERAL EQUITY CASES
A. Pre-Erie
Federal equity is as old as the federal courts themselves. The Judiciary Act of
1789 created a set of federal trial courts and gave them jurisdiction over "all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity" involving diverse parties and an
amount in controversy in excess of $500.'" Unlike the judicial systems of England
and several of the states, however, the federal judiciary was not divided into
separate courts of common law and equity, but was instead a single system with
law and equity sides. Even within this unitary system, however, Congress retained
the traditional preeminence of common law over equity, explicitly barring suits on
the equity side where a "plain, adequate and compete remedy" was available at
common law.'s Additional provisions of the Juciciary Actpreserved the traditional
customs of the equity courts. 9
The 1789 Judiciary Act also contained the original Rules of Decision Act.20
That provision, however, explicitly controlled only "trials'at common law." The
1789 Act failed to specify what rules of decision were to apply in either equity or
admiralty/maritime cases.
One week after passing the original Judiciary Act, Congress enacted a
companion statute regulating procedure in the new federal courts.2' This statute
also distinguished the common-law and equity sides of the federal courts.
Paralleling the Rules of Decision Act, the 1789 Process Act required that the
modes of proceeding in common law cases "be the same in each state respectively
as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same." 22 In equity,
however, the courts were to adopt the modes and proceedings of the civil law.23
The 1789 Process Act was intended to be a temporary solution, and was
accordingly replaced in 1792.24 The 1792 Process Act remained in force for all of
17. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 78 (1789).
18. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 16, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 82 (1789).
19. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, required judges both in equity and in
admiralty and maritime to state their factual findings in detail. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 19, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 83 (1789).
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
21. "An Act to Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States," ch. 21, I Stat. 93 (1789).
22. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 2, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (1789).
23. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 2, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 94 (1789).
24. The 1789 Act expired by its terms in 1790, at the end of the second term of the first Congress.
Congress extended the provision for one additional session in both 1790, "An Act to continue in force
an act passed at the last session of Congress, entituled [sic] 'An act to regulate processes in the Courts
of the United States,"' ch. 23, 1 Stat. 123 (1790), and 1791, "An Act to continue in force, for a limited
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the nineteenth century and almost half of the twentieth." It therefore played a
significant role in the development of federal equity prior to Erie. Like its 1789
counterpart, the 1792 Act generally required federal courts in common-law actions
to conform their modes of proceeding to state practice.26 However, Congress
changed the rules governing proceedings in equity. Instead of the civil law,
Congress required equity proceedings to conform to "the principles, rules and
usages which belong to courts of equity.., as contradistinguished from courts of
,,17
common law....
Viewed from our post-Erie vantage point, that reference to "courts of equity"
may seem ambiguous because Congress failed to specify which of the several
systems of equity courts it intended the federal courts to mirror. To the Supreme
Court of the era, however, Congress's intent was clear. In Robinson v. Campbell,"
the Court considered whether a defendant could interpose an equitable defense in
a common-law action in federal court.29 The defendant claimed that state law
allowed it to assert that defense at common law. Because Robinson was a
common-law action, that state law would arguably apply in federal court because
of the Rules of Decision Act. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the
defense was not available in federal court, relying on the 1792 Process Act."
time, An act passed at the first session of Congress, intituled (sic] 'An act to regulate
processes in the Courts of the United States,"' ch. 23, 1 Stat. 123 (1791). The 1792 Act is "An Act for
regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States and providing Compensations for the Officers
of the said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses," ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (1792) [hereinafter "Conformity
Act"].
25. The provision was commonly called the "Conformity Act," and was eventually codified at 28
U.S.C. § 723 (1948). That provision was dropped when the Judicial Code was revised and recodified
in 1948. "'An Act to revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled
'Judicial Code and Judiciary,"' ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948); lB Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Charles R.
Haworth, Congress and the Courts: A Legislative History 1787-1977 1551 table 2 (1978).
However, Congress did not specifically abolish the provision. Rather, the Reviser apparently
decided that the provision was no longer relevant given the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The legislative history in the 1948 Annotated States-the last volume in which § 723
appeared-contains the following notation by the Reviser: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...
supplant the Equity Rules since in general they cover the field now covered by the Equity Rules and the
Conformity Act."
26. Conformity Act, § 2, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 276 (1792).
27. Id. This provision also applied to admiralty. The requirement to follow the rules of equity
and admiralty was not absolute, but was subject "to such alterations and additions as the said courts
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations as the supreme court of the
United States shall think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court
concerning the same ...." Id. Thus, federal courts had a power to regulate their own procedure well
before the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994), was enacted in 1938.
28. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818).
29. Plaintiffhad sued for ejectment, claiming that defendant wrongfully occupied plaintiff's land
in Tennessee. Id. at 213. Defendant responded by claiming that it had equitable title to the property.
Id. at 218.
30. Id. at 220.
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Although the Court's lengthy discussion of the Process Act is arguably dictum,3
it illustrates the Court's view of the nature of federal equity.
To the Court, the language in the 1792 Act directing federal courts in equity
to apply the "principles, rules, and usages which belong to the courts of equity"
referred to the rules prevailing in English Chancery, not those in any particular
state." Traditionally, a defendant could assert the equitable defense involved in
Robinson only in equity, not in a common-law action.33 Moreover, the Court
treated the 1792 Process Act as a statute defining the subject-matterjurisdiction of
the federal courts, giving those courts the authority to hear the particular defense
only when they sat in equity.' States, of course, cannot regulate the subject-matter
jurisdiction ofthe federal courts. Therefore, notwithstanding the Rules of Decision
Act's mandate to follow state law in suits at common law, a state law like that in
Robinson, which expanded common-law jurisdiction at the expense of equity,
could not apply in the federal courts.
On the other hand, the Robinson Court indicated that states were not
completely powerless to alter the traditional division between law and equity.
Because states retain the authority to regulate property ownership, the Court
recognized that a state statute might change the result. If a state legislature
had codified the defense asserted in Robinson, that defense would be part
of the legal title and would therefore be available even in a common-law
action."
The basic principles established in Robinson continued to guide the courts over
the next hundred years. Several Supreme Court cases applied those principles in
deciding whether a federal court of equity was precluded from hearing a case
because an adequate remedy existed at common law. Analogizing to Robinson,
these cases concluded that because an adequate legal remedy deprives a court of
its equity jurisdiction, a federal court should consider only federal, not state,
remedies in determining adequacy of the remedy at law.36 The Court used similar
jurisdiction-based arguments in holding that a federal court could ignore other state
rules, such as limits on the scope of an injunction,3 requirements that a party first
31. Earlier in the opinion, the Court found that because title to the land had originally been
acquired from Virginia, defendant could not avail itself of an equitable title based on Tennessee law.
Id. at 220.
32. Id. at 222.
33. Id. at 222.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Id. at 222.
36. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 114, 35 S. Ct. 527,530 (1915); Cowley v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 159 U.S. 569,580-81,16 S. Ct. 127,130 (1895) (claim under territorial law, which allowed a court
to set aside a state court judgment, could not have been heard in federal court); Mississippi Mills v.
Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 206, 14 S. Ct. 75, 76 (1893); McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201,206, 7 S. Ct.
940, 942 (1887); Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867); United States v.
Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 115 (1819).
37. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 657-58 (1832).
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proceed before a probate court,3" and even the complete absence of any state courts
of equity. 9
However, the Court did not forget its suggestion in Robinson that state
legislatures could affect cases in equity by either enlarging or constricting the basic
substantive rights of the litigants. The seminal case was Clark v. Smith."' In this
case, Clark (a descendant of George Rogers Clark) brought what would today be
called a suit to remove a cloud on title to land in Kentucky. He filed suit in federal
equity, requesting an order requiring Smith to deliver a quitclaim deed." Although
such an action would apparently not have been available in English Chancery, 2 the
Kentucky legislature had explicitly granted the right to such a conveyance to senior
claimants such as Clark. 3
The Court held that Clark was entitled to the relief he had requested even
though he had sued in federal equity. In reaching that conclusion, the Court
distinguished between the underlying substantive right and the remedy:
Kentucky has the undoubted power to regulate and protect individual
rights to her soil, and to declare what shall form a cloud on titles; and
having so declared, the Courts of the United States, by removing such
clouds, are only applying an old practice to a new equity created by the
legislature, having its origin in the peculiar condition of the country....
Kentucky may prescribe any policy for the protection of the agriculture of
the country that she may deem wise and proper; she has in effect declared,
that junior patents, issued for previously granted lands, shall be delivered
up and cancelled; with the addition, that a release of the title shall be
executed: and it is the duty of the Courts to execute the policy."
In essence, then, the Kentucky law created a new substantive right. That
substantive right could be enforced at common law, or if the common-law remedy
were inadequate, in equity. Interestingly, the Court apparently assumed that federal
courts in equity would enforce the state-law right even though the Rules of
Decision Act did not apply in equity.
The Court next turned to the question of remedy. In addition to creating the
new right, the Kentucky legislature had also specified how that right was to be
effectuated; namely, by an order requiring the defendant to execute and deliver a
deed conveying his interest to the plaintiff.'" As a general proposition, the Court
38. Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425,430 (1868).
39. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632.657 (1835). This result had been foreshadowed by
Robinson and Howland.
40. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839).
41. Id. at 202.
42. The Court never explicitly says that the plaintiff could not have sued in Chancery, but that
premise is implicit in its logic.
43. Clark, 38 U.S. at 202.
44. Id. at 203.
45. The Kentucky statute explicitly stated, "[I]f the complainant shall be able to establish his title
to such land, the defendant shall be decreed to release his claim thereto ..... d. at 202.
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noted, states do not have the authority to regulate the procedure in federal courts.'
"Procedure" includes remedy."7 However, where the legislature had provided a
remedy that was "substantiallyconsistent" with the traditional modes ofproceeding
in equity, the Court saw no reason why the federal court should not afford the
statutory remedy."8
The Court then went one step further, strongly suggesting that in a case like
Clark the federal court was actually obligated to provide the statutory remedy. It
found that the underlying right created by the Kentucky legislature-the right to
clear the title of adverse claims-would be fully effective only if the defendant
were to convey its interest.49 Therefore, the Court reasoned, "had the form of the
remedy been rejected by the Courts of the United States, the right to have such
record conveyance would have fallen with it, as they could not be separated." This
passage represents the birth of the idea of a "right/remedy merger," which was to
become increasingly important in the years following Erie.
After Clark, the relevance of state law in federal equity differed depending on
whether the issue was one of right or remedy. In both cases, however, the default
rules were those applied in English Chancery. With respect to matters of right, the
Court applied the traditional rules unless those rules had been modified by a state
legislature. A state legislature could provide additional substantive rights, which
the federal courts in equity would enforce even if no analogous action existed in
English Chancery.s° Conversely, if a state legislature abolished or limited a right
traditionally available in equity, federal courts would similarly defer to the
legislature's power to define legal relationships and dismiss the claim or defense.5
46. Id. at 203.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 204. The Court stated that "had the form of the remedy been rejected by the Courts of
the United States, the right to have such record conveyance would have fallen with it, as they could not
be separated." Id.
50. Missouri, K&T Trust v. Krumseig, 172 U.S. 351, 19 S. Ct. 179 (1899) (state law allowing
cancellation of a usurious contract); Reyolds v. Crawfordsville First Nat'l Bank, 112 U.S. 405,410-11,
5 S. Ct. 213, 216 (1884) (state law defines what constitutes a cloud on title); Holland v. Challen, 110
U.S. 15, 24-25, 3 S. Ct. 495, 501 (1884) (state law giving parties not in possession the right to bring
a quiet title action); Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503, 519-20 (1874) (state law
allowing a challenge to a will).
51. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545,555-57, 43 S. Ct. 200,203 (1923) (limitation on state-
law right should be applied in federal equity).
Language in an 1851 Supreme Court opinion suggests that a federal court in equity would be free to
grant relief even if the state had limited the underlying right. Neves v. Scott, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 268,
272 (1851). However, in that case the limitation on the right had been imposed by the state supreme
court, not the legislature. Id. at 271. Moreover, the language suggesting that the federal court could
ignore the state-imposed restriction is dictum. Later in the opinion, the Court concluded that the state
court decision did not actually impose the limit that the party had claimed. Id. at 272-73.
Similarly, Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) is
not inconsistent with the right-remedy rule. The Court in that case admittedly held that a federal court
of equity should grant reliefnotwithstanding a state statute that arguably provided a substantive defense
to the underlying nuisance claim. Id. at 563. However, the Court held that the state-law defense could
not apply to an interstate river because of preemption. Id. at 565.
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When questions of procedure and remedy were involved, by contrast, state
legislation rarely controlled. Federal courts could grant a traditional equitable
remedy even if the state legislature had limited or abolished it," and was not bound
to grant new remedies created by the state unless a particular remedy was essential
to the underlying right."3 Aside from a few questionable applications,' this rule
proved fairly workable in practice.
B. The Impact of Erie
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins" threatened to undermine this neat framework. Read
broadly, the decision bars the federal courts from operating a separate and
independent system of legal rules.' The rules that federal courts were applying in
equity constituted just such a body ofjudge-made law. If the federal courts could
not create their own rules governing equitable rights and remedies, they would by
default be obligated to apply governing state law.
Had the Erie Court confined its discussion to the Rules of Decision Act, the
case probably would have had little impact in equity, as the Rules of Decision Act
still applied only to actions at common law. But the majority made it clear that the
new paradigm was also mandated by the Constitution. 57 Allowing federal courts
to make binding rules of law would give the federal government a de facto
legislative jurisdiction in areas that Article I reserved to the states. That threat to
state sovereignty exists regardless of whether the federal court crafting rules of law
sits in common law or equity.
52. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101,35 S. Ct. 526 (1915) (federal court could issue injunction even
though party could obtain only damages in state court).
53. Stratton v. St. Louis S.W.Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 530,52 S. Ct. 222 (1932) (federal court need not
grant state-law remedy); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521,529, 52 S. Ct. 217, 221 (1932) (same).
54. How the Supreme Court labeled certain issues was at times somewhat questionable. For
example, in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 , 43 S. Ct. 454 (1923), the Court held that a state
statute that gave an unsecured creditor the right to have a receiver take over the debtor's assets was an
issue of remedy that did not apply in a federal court in equity. The opinion acknowledges that without
the statute, an unsecured creditor had no property interest in the debtor's assets. Id. at 497. The only
way for an unsecured creditor to gain a right to those assets would be by executing on a money
judgment. The Court nevertheless reasoned that the receivership was merely a way to preserve assets
so that those assets would be available to satisfy a later money judgment. Id. Because the creditor still
needed the later money judgment actually to reach the assets, the receivership itself was not a
"substantive" right.
Of course, the Court could just as easily have concluded that the creditor's power to prevent transfer
of the debtor's assets was itself a new substantive right, especially given some the Court's earlier
precedent. In Clark, Holland, and Reynolds, the Court had held that state laws defining what
constituted a cloud on a title were matters of right. The Court's attempt to distinguish these cases in
Pusey is not at all convincing. Like Clark and Holland, the state law at issue in Pusey extended a new
right to a party who historically could not bring such an action.
55. 304 U.S. 64,58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
56. Id. at 78, 58 S. Ct. at 822 ("There is no federal general common law.").
57. Id. at 77-78, 58 S. Ct. at 822 ("If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so.").
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The Court took only one week to confirm that Erie applied to equity. Ruhlin
v. New York Life Insurance Co.58 was a suit in which an insurance company sought
cancellation59 of life insurance policies because of misrepresentations made by the
insured.'c Although the policy had an incontestability clause barring any such
challenge, some pre-Erie federal cases, applying general commercial law, had held
those incontestability clauses inapplicable to the specific policy provisions at issue
in Ruhlin. 6 Both the trial and appellate courts had applied this general rule.62 The
Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to apply state law.3
Discussing Erie, the Court stated, "[t]he doctrine applies though the question of
construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in equity.""
Actually, Ruhlin was not that dramatic a departure from the pre-Erie approach.
As noted above, federal courts in equity already applied state law on questions of
right.65 The underlying issue in Ruhlin, whether a contract provision would be
enforced, was clearly a matter of right, not remedy. Had the state law been set out
in a statute, a federal equity court would have applied it even before Erie. The
twist in Ruhlin was that the state law was contained in judicial decisions, not a
statute. Thus, the "doctrine" that Ruhlin borrows from Erie is the notion that state
law includes state-court precedent. After Erie, a federal court must look to both
statute and case law to determine the litigants' respective rights.
Ruhlin left unanswered the more important question of whether Erie also
required use of state laws governing remedy. That issue came before the Court
almost exactly one year later. Like Ruhlin, Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. WI.
Southern, Inc.6 was a suit to cancel life insurance policies based on misrepresen-
tations by the insured. The trial court dismissed the action for cancellation because
it found the insurance company's common-law remedy to be adequate.67 Oklahoma
law allowed an insurance company sued in common law to assert the fraud as a
defense to a claim under the policy and to bring a counterclaim to cancel the
policy.6 In fact, a common-law action on the policy was already pending in state
court.69 If that state-court action was an adequate remedy at law, the trial court's
decision was correct.
58. 304 U.S. 202, 58 S. Ct. 860 (1938).
59. This article will use the technical term "cancellation" instead of the more commonplace term
"rescission" for the sake of precision. Historically, there were two separate remedies of rescission, one
available in equity and the other at common-law. The common-law remedy was unilateral, while the
remedy in equity required court intervention. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 415 (2d
ed. 1993).
60. 304 U.S. at 203, 58 S. Ct. at 860.
61. Id. at 204-05, 58 S. Ct. at 860-61.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 206, 58 S. Ct. at 861.
64. Id. at 205, 58 S. Ct. at 861.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 50 to 51.
66. 306 U.S. 563, 59 S. Ct. 657 (1939).
67. Id. at 567, 59 S. Ct. at 659.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 566, 59 S. Ct. at 659.
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However, the Court was faced with the long-established rule, discussed
above,7" that a federal court of equity was ousted of jurisdiction only by legal
remedies available in federal court. The Court could have disposed of the case
simply by holding that beqcause Erie required the federal court to apply the state-law
legal remedy, that remedy was now available in federal court.7 It opted instead for
a more oblique approach. In a somewhat tortured argument, the Court concluded
that although the state legal action did not deprive the federal court of equitable
jurisdiction, itundermined the plaintiff's case for equitable relief. Cancellation is
available, the Court reasoned, only when the party would otherwise suffer
irreparable injury. If the insurance company could interpose fraud as a defense
in the pending state-court case, it faced no risk of irreparable injury. The Court
therefore remanded to allow the lower court to deternine if any special circum-
stances might prevent the insurance company from making full use of the fraud
defense in the state-court action." Assuming no such circumstances, the federal
court's initial decision to deny equitable relief would be upheld.
Atlas Life, then, did not completely reject the pre-Erie rule that adequacy of
legal remedy was to be determined only by reference to the legal remedies available
in federal court. Although a federal court now had to consider how the case would
be treated in the state system, the outcome in state court was a factor only in
determining whether the federal court should grant a particular remedy, not on the
more fundamental issue of whether the federal court could sit in equity. More
significantly, the Court indicated in dictum that federal equity jurisdiction remained
a purely federal matter controlled by federal statute:
The "jurisdiction" thus conferred on the federal courts to entertain suits
in equity is an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the
system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the
separation of the two countries. This clause of the statute does not define
the jurisdiction of the district courts as federal courts, in the sense of their
power or authority to hear and decide, but prescribes the body of doctrine
which is to guide their decisions and enable them to determine whether in
any given instance a suit of which a district court has jurisdiction as a
federal court is an appropriate one for the exercise of the extraordinary
powers of a court of equity.7'
That language suggests that national equitable rules determine not only whether a
federal court can sit in equity, but also how it disposes of a given case.
70. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
71. Taking this task would have required the federal court to modify its procedure to the extent
necessary to allow at least the defense of fraud to be asserted in the common-law action.
72. 306 U.S. at 570, 59 S. Ct. at 660 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 572, 59 S. Ct. at661.
74. Id. at 568, 59 S. Ct. at 651-60 (emphasis added).
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Three other decisions rendered in the immediate wake of Erie confirm this
reading of Atlas. In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank," the Court upheld a federal
court's award of attorney's fees and costs to a litigant in equity. The Court
supported the ruling by reference to the "recognized power of equity" to grant such
remedies, 6 without even considering whether state law would allow recoveiy of
fees. Shortly thereafter, Russell v. Todd" upheld a lower court's use of laches in
a case seeking equitable relief, even though the state statute of limitations had
expired. Although Sprague and Russell involved claims arising under a federal
statute, both cases support the general notion that there exists a uniform body of
federal equity rules.
Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co.7" applied that reasoning to a suit arising
under state law. In this case a surety under a bond brought a diversity action in
federal court against its principal, the administrator of an estate. 9 Distribution of
that estate had already been challenged in state court.80 The surety had come to
federal court seeking appointment of a receiver for the estate assets pending
resolution of the state-court proceeding."' The Supreme Court held that receiver-
ships were unavailable in this sort of situation, citing a series of federal court
cases." The Court found it irrelevant that state law allowed for a receiver.83
Quoting from a pre-Erie decision, the Court merely noted that "a remedial right to
proceed in a federal court sitting in equity cannot be enlarged by a state statute."84
One other decision from this period warrants a brief mention. Although it is
not cast in terms of a clash between state and federal law, Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven" affords considerable insight into the Court's views concerning the
unique powers of federal equity. Meredith dealt with abstention. It held that a
federal court may not abstain in a diversity case merely because state law is
unclear. 6 The Court distinguished a number of its earlier decisions allowing
abstention by noting that those cases involved "the discretionary powers of courts
75. 307 U.S. 161, 59 S. Ct. 777 (1939).
76. Id. at 166, 59 S. Ct. at 779-80.
77. 309 U.S. 280, 60 S. Ct. 527 (1940).
78. 312 U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct. 595 (1941).
79. Id. at 378, 61 S. Ct. at 596-97.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 379, 61 S. Ct. at 597.
82. Id. at 381, 61 S. Ct. at 598. These decisions were based on the rationale that a receivership
is a remedy that is ancillary to another remedy, not an end in itself.
The surety, had also requested an order exonerating it from liability on the bond, based on alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the administrator. The Supreme Court's order of reversal also applied to
the trial court's order of exoneration. Id. at 379, 61 S. Ct. at 597. The Court disposed of the
exoneration question in short order. It noted that the right to exoneration is contingent, becoming
available only if the state court were to determine that the estate had been distributed to the wrong
people. Id. at 380, 61 S. Ct. at 597-98. Because exoneration was not yet available, the Court treated
the receivership as the "essential purpose" of the case. Id.
83. Id. at 381-82, 61 S. Ct. at 598-99.
84. Id.
85. 320 U.S. 228,64 S. Ct. 7 (1943).
86. Id. at 236, 64 S. Ct. at 11-12.
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of equity.""7 Unlike Meredith, all of those earlier cases involved considerations of
federalism that made the federal courts hesitant to exercise their broad authority in
equity. 8 It is interesting to note, however, that those federalism concerns would
not have caused most state courts of equity to dismiss the case. Therefore,
Meredith tacitly established that a federal court of equity may dismiss a
case-effectively refusing to grant any relief-notwithstanding that state tribunals
would hear the case and afford relief to the claimant.
On the eve of York, then, Erie had caused only a minor disruption in federal
equity. Notwithstanding Erie's bold statements about the federal courts' lack of
any general lawmaking authority, and the extension of that principle to equity in
Ruhlin, the Court still indicated that federal courts in equity retained independent
authority in questions of remedy. In deciding what remedy to grant in a particular
case, courts were to apply a uniform body of federal rules, not state law.
C. York
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York89 was a diversity action brought by the beneficiary
of a trust against the trustee.' An action to enforce a duty arising from a trust was
within traditional equity jurisdiction.9' The plaintiff asked the court to order an
accounting, a traditional equitable remedy. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, concluding that because the particular arrangement did
not constitute a trust, the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief.'
The Second Circuit reversed. It first found that the arrangement did constitute
a trust.93 The appellate court then rejected the defendant's alternate contention that
the action was barred by the New York statute of limitations. Although acknowl-
edging the New York statute, the Court of Appeals held that the limitations period
should be extended because of the defendant's inequitable conduct." In answer
to the defendant's argument that Erie required the federal court to apply the New
York statute as written,9 the Court held that because laches was a question of
87. Id. at 235-36,64 S. Ct. at 11-12.
88. Id. Although Meredith itself was also a case in equity, the only reason the district court gave
for abstaining was the ambiguity in state law, not any of the policy reasons cited with approval by the
Court.
89. 326U.S. 99,65S. Ct. 1464(1945).
90. The underlying dispute was highly complicated, and is described in great detail in the
appellate court's opinion. York v. GuarantyTrust Co., 143 F.2d 503,505-12 (2dCir. 1944), rev'd, 326
U.S. 99,65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
91. Id. at 525. See generally Henry L McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity 102
(2d ed. 1948).
92. 143 F.2d at 512.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 528.
95. Id. at 52 1. New York had two potentially applicable statutes of limitations. In a state court,
the action against the trustee could be brought in common-law, in which case it would be governed by
a six-year limitations period. Id. New York also had a ten-year statute of limitations that applied to




remedy, not right, Russell v. Todd' required the federal court to apply national
law."
The Supreme Court reversed, relying solely upon the statute of limitations.
The Court first confirmed that Erie applied in equity notwithstanding that the Rules
of Decision Act referred only to common law." The Court then turned to the
narrower question of whether a federal court in equity was bound to honor a state
statute of limitations. It began by reaffirming the basic distinction between right
and remedy, restating the argument it had used in Atlas Life." Equity is different
than common-law, the Court reasoned, even in the context of Erie. When it gave
federal courts jurisdiction over equity in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
intended to create a system much like traditional English Chancery. The essence
of that system was the freedom of the courts to exercise discretion in determining
appropriate relief for a wrong. In addition to copying the basic structure of equity,
Congress also transplanted to the United States the set of rules and principles that
applied in the English Court of Chancery. " Accordingly, a federal court in equity
was not bound by state law governing equitable remedies:
This does not mean that whatever equitable remedy is available in a State
court must be available in a diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely,
that a federal court may not afford an equitable remedy not available in a
State court. Equitable relief in a federal court is of course subject to
restrictions: the suit must be within the traditional scope of equity as
historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery, a plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law must be wanting, explicit Congressional
curtailment of equity powers must be respected, the constitutional right to
trial byjury cannot be evaded. That a State may authorize its court to give
equitable relief unhampered by any or all such restrictions cannot remove
these fetters from the federal courts. State law cannot defime the remedies
which a federal court must give simply because a federal court in diversity
jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal to the State's courts.
Contrariwise, a federal court may afford an equitable remedy for a
substantive right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot
give it.'0 '
At the same time, however, the Court indicated that state law still controlled
the parties' basic rights:
In giving federal courts "cognizance" of equity suits in cases of diversity
jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim,
96. 309 U.S. 280, 60 S. Ct. 527 (1940). Russell is discussed supra at text accompanying note
77.
97. 143 F.2d at 522-23.
98. 326 U.S. at 102-05,65 S. CL at 1466-68.
99. Atlas Life is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 66 to 74.
100. 326 U.S. at 105,65 S. Ct. at 1467-68.
101. Id. at 105-06, 65 S. Ct. at 1468-69 (citations omitted).
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the power to deny substantive rights created by State law or to create
substantive rights denied by State law.'
02
In essence, the Court confirmed that the right/remedy approach employed in the
early cases was the proper measure of federal judicial authority in equity.
However, York presented a twist on the right-remedy problem. State law
clearly gave beneficiaries of a trust the right to sue their trustee. However, that
right was subject to the statute of limitations. Once the limitations period expired,
the beneficiaries could no longer obtain relief in any state court, including a state
court of equity. 3 If a federal court ignored the limitations period and granted any
relief, it would effectively create a new substantive right for the plaintiff,
enforceable only in federal court. By that measure, the New York statute of
limitations was undeniably a matter of right instead of remedy.
However, the Court was also faced with a considerable volume of precedent
holding that statutes of limitation were "remedial" or "procedural." Noting that
these cases involved issues such as retroactivity and choice of law,"° the Court
found them easily distinguishable. It reasoned that the policies underlying
retroactivity and choice of law were quite different than the federalism concerns
involved in Erie. This discussion of the goals of Erie led to the Court's well-
known "outcome determinative" test. Because one of the purposes of Erie was to
ensure that the outcome of a given suit be substantially the same regardless of
whether it was litigated in federal or state court,' a rule would be considered
procedural-and therefore governed by a uniform federal rule-only if it would not
materially affect the outcome. According to that logic, the New York statute of
limitations that barred the action was clearly substantive. '0
Although the York Court did require the lower court to apply the particular
state law in question, the language of the opinion generally ratifies the approach
used in equity both before and immediately after Erie.'7 The main impact was the
102. Id. at 105, 65 S. Ct. at 1468. Later in the opinion, the Court restated this basic premise:
[T]he body of adjudications concerning equitable relief in diversity cases leaves no doubt,
that the federal courts enforced State-created rights if the mode of proceeding and remedy
were consonant with the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice, and procedure, and
in so doing they were enforcing rights created by the States and not arising under any
inherent or statutory federal law.
Id. at 106-07,65 S. Ct. at 1469.
. 103. Id. at 107-08, 65 S. Ct. at 1470. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the New York
courts would actually invoke the statute to bar the action, id. at 101, 65 S. Ct. at 1465, but remanded
to the appellate court for that determination.
104. Id. at 108, 65 S. Ct. at 1471.
105. Id. at 109, 65 S. Ct. at 1472.
106. As indicated in supra note 95, New York had two potentially applicable limitations
periods--a six-year period for common-law actions, and a ten-year period for actions in equity. The
Court never indicates which limitations period applied. Therefore, the decision does not answer the
question of whether a state's classification of an action as common-law or equitable binds a federal
court for purposes of selecting an appropriate statute of limitations.
107. Although the majority opinion questions the language of some of the earlier equity cases, it
indicates that the holdings in those cases were sound, with the possible exception of Kirby v. Lake
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Court's new defimition of procedure. Regardless of how mundane its topic, a state
rule that would completely bar recovery on a claim in all state courts must be
applied by a federal court that is adjudicating that same claim. Even if that state
rule looks procedural, Erie requires a federal court to follow it if has the effect of
terminating a substantive right. On the other hand, as long as a state court would
afford some relief on a claim, a federal court in equity can enforce that claim in
accordance with its own set of national equity practices.
D. Holmberg v. Armbrecht
The Court revisited Erie's effect on equity during its next term. Holmberg v.
Armbrecht"'0 also dealtwith the extent to which state statutes of limitations applied
in federal equity. As in York, the statutory period established by state law had
already expired.'" Unlike York, however, the underlying claim in Holmberg arose
under a federal statute."0 The Court found that difference crucial. In a case such
as York where the claim arose under state law, the state statute of limitations forms
a crucial element of the underlying right. Applying the state statute of limitations
was necessary to ensure that the federal court reached the same outcome as the
state courts. The Court declared that these considerations were "hardly relevant"
when the underlying right was one provided by Congress."' In federal statutory
cases, Congress had left to the federal courts the task of ascertaining an appropriate
limitations period, which might or might not mirror the state statute of
limitations."2
However, the Court again had to deal with adverse precedent. In several of its
earlier decisions, the Court had required lower federal courts to apply state
limitations periods even when dealing with claims arising under federal statutes." 3
The Court distinguished that precedent by noting that unlike those cases, the case
before it was in equity. " Determining the limitations period for a federal statutory
claim was, the Court reasoned, really a question of Congress's intent. In statutory
actions heard in common-law courts, congressional silence was normally
interpreted as a command to borrow the closest state limitations period.'
However, when Congress chose to create a right that could be enforced in equity,
the considerations were completely different. By sending its newly-created right
Shore & MichiganS.R.R., 120 U.S. 130,7 S. Ct. 430 (1887).
108. 327 U.S. 392,66 S. Ct. 582 (1946).
109. Id. at 393-94, 66 S. Ct. at 583.
110. Plaintiffs, creditors of an insolvent bank, had sued the bank's shareholders, seeking to pierce
the corporate veil and to have the personal assets of those shareholders applied to the bank's debts. A
federal statute, the Federal Farm Loan Act, assessed those shareholders for the outstanding liability of
the bank. Id. at 393, 66 S. Ct. at 583. The suit to enforce that assessment was available only in equity.
Id. at 395, 66 S. Ct. at 584.







to equity, Congress must have intended that it be enforced with the flexibility and
judicial discretion that are the hallmark of equity, not by "mechanical rules" that
may have been established by the states." 6 Therefore, Congress must have meant
for courts adjudicating these new statutory equitable rights to apply the flexible
doctrine of laches. 7 The Court accordingly remanded the case with instructions
to determine whether the claim was barred by laches."'
Taken together, York and Holmberg suggest a broad equity exception to Erie.
There is a uniform national law of equity, made up of the traditional rules that
governed English Chancery. In a federal question case like Holmberg, these
traditional principles apply instead of state law on most issues that may arise. Even
when the underlying substantive right arises under state law, York suggests that the
traditional principles apply in lieu of state law as long as the federal court does not
create new substintive rights or fundamentally alter existing rights.
E. Interpreting York and Holmberg
York and Holmberg are the last Supreme Court opinions that deal directly with
how Erie applies in equity." 9 However, the Erie doctrine has changed in certain
significant ways over the past half-century. Whether the Court's broad statements
about federal equity survive these new developments is a difficult question.
Because of the dearth of Supreme Court precedent directly on point, the burden of
answering that question has fallen upon the lower courts and the commentators.
The court decisions that involve an actual conflict between state and
federal law' ° are split. Most federal courts, including the Second, 2
116. Id. at 396,66 S. Ct. at 585.
117. Id. at 395-96,66 S. Ct. at 585.
118. Id. at 397-98, 66 S. Ct. at 587.
119. On the other hand, just three years after reshaping Erie in Hanna, the Court indicated in
dictum that the question was still open. Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 88 S. Ct. 1332(1968), was a shareholder's derivative action litigated in federal court on the basis of diversity. The
plaintiff sought an order requiring the corporation to open its books for inspection. The lower court
denied this request based on federal precedent indicating that courts would not grant these orders when
they were the only relief sought by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed because it found a clear
right to such an order in state law. The Court expressly indicated that it was not facing the question of
whether the federal court could grant such an order if state law did not allow it. Id. at 609-10, 88 S. Ct.
at 1334.
120. Absent a conflict between state and federal law, Erie is for all practical purposes a moot point.
For this reason, one can immediately disregard the several cases that "select" state or federal law in
equity, even though both rules would produce the same outcome. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Wooloohojian
Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1991) (allows federal court to order a buyout in a corporate
dissolution case; court assumes "for the sake of argument" that state law controlled); Friends for All
Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applies District
of Columbia law, but predicts that law would employ the same general principles that federal equity
courts use); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953) (applies state law to determine whether
injunction should issue, but calls the question "academic" because of the absence of any conflict);
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden, 166 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (specific performance).
121. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1981) (federal court may
issue a recall order even if state courts cannot).
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Fifth,122 and Seventh"7 circuits, as well as several district courts,'24 have relied on
York to hold that a federal court in equity is not bound by state rules dealing with
equitable procedure and remedies. The Third Circuit has agreed with this
conclusion in dictum. ' On the other hand, virtually all courts look to state law for
the rules governing the equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands. 126
The Ninth Circuit and a few district courts go even further, requiring the use
of state law even on matters of remedy. 7 Some of these courts give no reason for
122. Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970), reh g denied, 434
F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 99, 91 S. CL 1319 (1971) (federal court may order a debtor to
assemble equipment covered by a security interest even though a state court would require a creditor
to seek such relief in detinue); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 191 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 195 1),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920, 72 S. Ct. 368 (1952) (state statute establishing a new action at law does not
preclude a federal court from enforcing the underlying right in equity).
123. General Elec. Co. v. American Wholesale Co., 235 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1956) (preliminary
injunction governed by federal law). The Seventh Circuit's more recent opinion in Hayes v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1983) does not overturn General Electric. Although the court in
Hayes did deny relief to the plaintiffbased upon state law, the state law in question dealt with not with
the remedy, but with the underlying substantive right. Even before Erie federal courts in equity looked
to state law to determine the relative legal rights of the litigants.
124. See also Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Or. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 780
(9th Cir. 1964) (federal law governs injunction); Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 487
F. Supp. 1248 (D. Md 1980), aff'd, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1981) (federal law governs preliminary
injunction); Irving Trust v. Braswell, 596 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); and Hart v. Dart
Group Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549 (D. Del. 1993) (applies federal law to determine unclean hands without
even considering state-law rule).
125. Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985) (state rule providing that an
order of accounting is available only in cases where the party also seeks an injunction does not prevent
a federal court from granting an order of accounting even where no injunction is sought; discussion is
dictum as the court expresses doubt as to whether such a state-law limitation on accounting orders
actually exists).
126. The decisions dealing with equitable defenses are legion. For a small sample of-the more
recent decisions dealing with laches, see Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Cal., 135 F.3d 684
(10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Office of Personnel Management, 87 F.3d 471 (Fed. Cir. 1996), reh 'g
denied; Goodman v. Lee, 78 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861, 117 S. Ct. 166
(1996); Landreth v. First Nat'l Bank of Cleburne County, 45 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 1995); Maksym v.
Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1991), reh 'g denied; Johns v. Rozet, 141 F.R.D. 211 (D.D.C. 1992);
for cases dealing with unclean hands, see In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994); Foy
v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1993); Stephens, Inc. v. Gedermann, Inc., 962 F.2d 808 (8th Cir.
1992). Most of these decisions apply state law without even considering whether that law differs from
the federal rule.
127. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal court cannot grant a
preliminary injunction when a state statute explicitly prohibits it); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264
F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (state law controls whether an injunction is available in a trade secrets
case); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Bercrose Assoc., 563 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Conn. 1983), vacated, 732
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1984) (state law controls whether injunction is available in a case brought to enforce
a covenant not to compete); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Halchak, 71 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (state
law controls whether a parallel suit may be enjoined); Anglo-American Inv. Trust, Ltd. v. Pearson, 294
F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (state law controls preliminary injunction, no mention of Seventh
Circuit opinion in General Electric, supra note 123); Kaiser Trading Co. v. Association Metals &
Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 197 1)
(applies state law to preliminary injunction); Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F.
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resorting to state law."'8 Most of the other decisions conclude that because
differences in remedy directly affect the outcome of litigation, the Supreme Court's
later Erie cases mandate use of state law. 29
Two cases take a middle ground.'30 Although citing the language in York
suggesting that Erie does not apply to most questions of equitable remedies, these
courts nevertheless apply state law governing a preliminary injunction. Both courts
conclude that because a preliminary injunction is inextricably intertwined with the
substantive right, denying the remedy would be akin to refusing to recognize the
right.'3 ' This reasoning mirrors the "right-remedy merger" concept first established
in the 1851 Clark v. Smith case.
32
Two leading commentaries conclude that when the underlying right arises
under state law, state law controls even on questions of equitable remedy. In an
article dealing mainly with preliminary injunctions, Professor Crump argues that
federal courts should ordinarily turn to state law to determine when relief should
be granted. 33 Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper devote a section of their
Treatise to the more general question of equitable remedies. 134 They too reject the
dictum in York, concluding that more recent Supreme Court cases require a federal
court to apply state rules governing equitable remedies.' In their opinion, federal
courts can apply a federal law of remedies only when hearing a claim arising under
a federal statute or when the remedy is contained in a rule promulgated under the
Rules Enabling Act. 36 Like Professor Crump, however, they concede that there
might be "exceptional cases" in which a federal court sitting in diversity could
Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (applies state law to preliminary injunction).
128. Genovese, 563 F. Supp. at 1304 (court merely cites Perfect Fit, which actually held to the
contrary, and Franke, in which the discussion was dictum as there was no conflict); Anglo-American
Investment, 294 F. Supp. at 1153 (court cites Goldman v. Henry'sDrive In, Inc., 314 F.2d 162 (7th Cir.
1963), where the parties had agreed that state law controlled).
129. Sims, 863 F.2dat646-47;Halchak,71 F. Supp. at226;StandardiBrands,264 F. Supp. at 263
n.16.
130. Kaiser Trading, 321 F. Supp. at 931 n.14; Port of New York, 259 F. Supp. at 753.
131. Kaiser Trading, 321 F. Supp. at 931 n.14; Port ofNew York, 259 F. Supp. at 753. Because
of these special circumstances, Port of New York is not necessarily inconsistent with Second Circuit's
later Perfect Fit decision, supra note 12 1.
132. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839) discussed supra at text accompanying notes 40
to 49.
133. David Crump, The Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a Different Choice
of Equitable Remedies in the "Court a Block Away? " 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1233, 1272-73. He cites
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65, which governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions, as the main exception. Because that rule was promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990), it is subject to a different standard than would apply to most federal judge-
made law in equity. Therefore, Professor Crump may not be willing to concede that a federal court's
Inherent power to fashion rules in equity is limited to those few rules that would not cause forum-
shopping.
134. 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4513, at 425 (2d ed. 1996).
135. Id. at446.
136. Id. at 442-46.
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apply different equity rules than a state court, as long as the final result was
"consistent with the state-created rights of the parties."' 37
The remainder of this article will argue that York and Holmberg are good law.
Federal courts have an inherent power to create their own rules for equity cases,
even if those rules differ from state law. Although the breadth of federal judge-
made law in equity is much greater in a federal question case like Holmberg than
in a state-law case like York, federal courts in both instances may apply their own
rules even if it would directly change the ultimate outcome of the case.
The problem with the arguments against a special federal power in equity is
that the analysis tends to be incomplete. More specifically, these courts and
commentators assume that a judge-made federal rule of equity is valid only to the
extent that it can be traced to a federal court's inherent power to regulate its own
"procedure." By limiting the discussion to procedure, they have failed to consider
other possible sources for an independent federal equity. Once these other
possibilities are taken into account, it becomes apparent that there is a valid federal
judge-made body of law in equity.
II. RECONCILING FEDERAL EQUITY WITH ERIE
The Supreme Court's discussions of a separate and independent body of
federal equity law in York and Holmberg seem difficult to square with the basic
axiom of Erie. Under Erie's "new way of looking at law,"'38 no legal rule is valid
unless it can be traced to a sovereign with legislative jurisdiction over the subject
of the rule. Unlike state courts, federal courts have no general lawmaking power.
Accordingly, in most cases federal courts have no choice but to use state law or a
federal statute.
Of course, Erie did not completely strip the federal courts of lawmaking
authority. York itself recognizes that the federal courts may create a body of
federal procedural law.'39 Later Supreme Court cases have refined York's test for
determining whether a particular federal judge-made rule qualifies as a rule of
procedure. 4" In addition, in certain areas federal courts have the power to craft
even the rules that define the basic rights and obligations of the litigants.'4' If
federal equity rules fall within either the procedural or substantive categories of
137. Id. at 450. They cite Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54(5th Cir. 1970),
reh' g denied, 434 F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 99, 91 S. Ct. 1319 (1971), as an example.
138. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,101, 65 S. Ct. 1464,1465 (1945).
139. Read literally, York actually suggests that federal courts may craft procedural rules only when
they sit in equity. The portion of the opinion discussing procedural rules, id. at 108-09, 65 S. Ct at
1469-70, follows the section dealing with the special powers of a court of equity, id. at 104-07, 65 S.
Ct.' at 1467-69. The Court never clearly states that federal courts have the power to craft rules of
procedure when they sit in common law. Nevertheless, later Supreme Court cases make it clear that a
federal court also has the authority to govern its own procedure in common-law cases. See, e.g., Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965) (tort damages action).
140. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 142 to 144.
141. See infra discussion at text accompanying notes 152 to 164.
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federal judge-made law, a federal court may apply them notwithstanding a contrary
state rule.
A. Procedural Federal Judge-Made Law
1. Basic Principles
The great majority of the Supreme Court's Erie decisions deal with the issue
of procedure. Of-these, the most significant is Hanna v. Plumer,4 2 which
established a framework for analyzing all questions of procedure. Hanna's most
notable feature is its recognition that there are actually two separate bodies of
federal procedural judge-made law. The first category, exemplified by Erie, York,
and most of the other pre-Hanna cases, is where a court simply crafts the rule of
its own volition. Hanna not only reaffirmed York's unstated assumption that
federal courts have the inherent authority to regulate their own procedure,143 but
also reshaped the analysis used to measure the validity of these "inherent"
procedural rules. Realizing that York's crude outcome determinative test was
unworkable, the Hanna Court incorporated the concept of forum-shopping,
resulting in the "twin aims/likely to cause forum shopping" test that remains the
mainstay of the analysis today.'" Under this test, a federal judge-made rule is truly
procedural, and therefore valid, if it is not likely to cause the litigants to choose
their forum based on the effect that differing state and federal rules would have on
the outcome of the case.
The Court did not, however, apply that test to the federal rule at issue in
Hanna. The rule in that case actually fell into the second category of valid judge-
made procedural law. The Federal Rules stem from the Rules Enabling Act, 4 by
which Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the Supreme Court. If that
delegation was proper, and the rule in question fell within the scope of the
delegation, the rule would constitute a valid federal law that would control in
federal litigation.
The Court upheld the federal service rule at issue in Hanna. In so doing, the
Court established three important principles. First, it held that Congress has the
constitutional authority to regulate procedure in the federal courts." 6 Second, it
confirmed its earlier holding in Lincoln Mills that Congress can delegate some of
142. 380U.S. 460,85S.Ct. 1136(1965).
143. Id. at 465, 85 S. Ct. at 1139.
144. Id. at 468, 85 S. Ct. at 114 1. Actually, the Court's test comprises a second element: whether
that forum shopping would lead to "inequitable administration of the laws." That second element
incorporates York's emphasis on outcome. Forum-shopping is objectionable when undertaken for the
purpose of obtaining a different result. Shopping among fora for other advantages, such as a lower
filing fee, presents no problems under Erie.
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990).
146. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472, 85 S. Ct. at 1143 ("the constitutional provision for a federal court
system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make
rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts,"); id. at 473, 85 S. Ct. at 1143 ("the long-
recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts").
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its legislative powers to the federal courts."7 Third, it indicated that the test for the
validity of a rule promulgated pursuant to a congressional delegation is not the
restrictive "likely to cause forum shopping" analysis that applies to the court's
inherent power to promulgate procedural rules, but instead whether the promul-
gated rule fits within the scope of the delegation. In the case of the Rules Enabling
Act, the Court concluded that the rule is valid as long as it truly regulates practice
and procedure, and does not "abridge, enlarge, or modify" a substantive right.4
Whether that rule might change the outcome, and thereby induce forum shopping,
is irrelevant.
2. Applying These Principles to Equity
Most discussions of Erie and equity focus on whether rules of equity fit within
the federal courts' inherent power to govern their own procedure. Clearly, the
expansive federal judge-made law of equity envisioned by York and Holmberg
cannot survive Hanna's test for inherent procedural rules. Differences in the
remedies available in state and federal courts would unquestionably lead to forum
shopping, as the desire for certain relief is the main reason people go to court.'49
The leading commentators also consider the extent to which rules of equity
might be justified as an exercise of delegated lawmaking power. "0 The few Rules
Enabling Act rules that deal with equitable matters, such as Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 62 and 65, are valid exercises of the Supreme Court's delegated
authority. But the vast majority of the corpus of federal equity law was not-and
probably could not be--promulgated by the Supreme Court under that Act.
Therefore, the Rules Enabling Act cannot support a system of federal equity law
as wide-ranging as that suggested in York and Holmberg.
Thus, the judges and commentators who conclude that the rules that comprise
federal equity go far beyond the federal courts' power to regulate procedure are
undoubtedly correct. But that conclusion does not end the matter. The Supreme
Court has on many occasions sustained judge-made federal laws that were
unquestionably substantive under either of Hanna's tests. A complete analysis
should also consider whether the broad scope of federal equity envisioned by York
qualifies as substantive federal judge-made law. As none of the discussions to date
147. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,77 S. Ct. 912 (1957).
Lincoln Mills is discussed again at infra text accompanying notes 161 to 164 and 178 to 181.
This delegation theory also provides a satisfactory answer to the separation of powers issues raised
by Erie. Federal judge-made law is not necessarily valid even when it regulates a matter within
Congress's Article I powers. Instead, Erie strongly reaffirms the notion that the Constitution vests the
federal legislative power exclusively in Congress, not the courts. On the other hand, if Congress
delegates that power to the courts, any law crafted pursuant to that delegation presents no separation
of powers problems.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990); 380 U.S. at 464, 85 S. Ct. at 1138.
149. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643,646-47 (9th Cir. 1988); Wright et al., supra
note 134, at 446.
150. Wright et al., supra note 134, at 442-44; Crump, supra note 133, at 1266-67.
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even considers that possibility,' it is necessary to explore this uncharted territory
in some detail.
B. Substantive Federal Judge-Made Law
1. Basic Principles
On the same day it released Erie, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.' In a unanimous...
opinion written by Justice Brandeis (who also wrote Erie), the Court held that
federal precedent, not state, controlled how water in an interstate stream should be
apportioned. " Although the opinion never uses the magic label "federal common
law," it clearly proceeds from the premise that the federal courts may define and
apply a uniform national law that differs from state law. Hinderlider was merely
the first in a long string of Supreme Court decisions that have applied federal
judge-made rules on issues that are clearly substantive.'
An analysis of substantive federal judge-made law can proceed along the same
basic lines as an analysis of procedural rules. On certain issues, federal courts have
an inherent power to define the substantive law." Moreover, Congress may
delegate portions of its lawmaking authority to the federal judiciary. Regardless
of whether it stems from a court's inherent power or from a delegation by
Congress, federal substantive judge-made law overrides state law and governs the
rights of the parties.' 5
151. Admittedly, it is easy to understand why the discussion of how Erie applies in equity has
focused entirely on the question of procedure, Many of the rules of equity appear procedural. In
addition, even York itself seems to imply a connection between equitable remedies and federal
procedure, see supra note 139. The natural implication is that equitable remedies are somehow
procedural in nature.
152. 304 U.S. 92,58 S. Ct. 803 (1938).
153. Justice Cardozo did not participate.
154. Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 101 -02, 58 S. Ct. at 806. The state law in question was a Colorado
decree that applied a contrary rule.
155. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512. 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23, 100 S. Ct. 1468, 1474 (1980); National Soc'y of Profl Engrs. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 98 S. Ct. 1355, 1363 (1978); United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580,594,93 S. Ct. 2389,2397-98 (1973); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 103, 92 S. Ct. 1385, 1392 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426, 84
S. Ct. 923,939 (1964); United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301,67 S. Ct. 1604 (1947); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S. Ct. 573, 574-75 (1943).
156. All of the cases cited in the prior footnote except for Illinois are examples of the federal
courts' inherent power.
157. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S. Ct. at 2518; llinois, 406 U.S. at 107, 93 S. Ct. at 1395,
In this respect, substantive federal judge-made law is quite different from the federal procedural rules
discussed above. Federal procedural rules ordinarily apply only to litigation in the federal courts. The
only situation in which state courts must follow federal procedure is when that procedure is an integral
part of a federal substantive right, see, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S.
359, 72 S. Ct. 312 (1952) (even though the seventh amendment to the Constitution does not apply to
the states, a state court hearing a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act must provide a jury).
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Congress may delegate lawmaking authority to the courts in various ways.
Although an express delegation analogous to the Rules Enabling Act is the most
obvious possibility, Congress rarely expressly delegates to the courts the power to
enact substantive law. Much more common is the implied delegation. Several
courts have interpreted a federal statute as containing an unexpressed delegation
of authority to enact those rules necessary to effectuate Congress's intent.
The typical implied delegation case involves a federal statute that contains no
specific provision dealing with a key issue, thereby requiring the court to find some
rule to fill the gap. Quite often, federal courts fill these gaps by grafting onto the
statutory rights and duties certain traditional principles of judge-made law. In
American Society ofMechanicalEngineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 's for example, the
Supreme Court held that an organization could be held vicariously liable for
antitrust violations committed by its agent notwithstanding any language in the
antitrust statute mentioning vicarious liability. Recognizing that Congress enacts
legislation against the backdrop of judicial precedent, the Court concluded that
absent some indication to the contrary, Congress intended for the federal courts to
apply general legal concepts, such as secondary liability, when enforcing statutory
rights. 59 Although Erie declares that federal courts have no inherent power to
create such a body of general rules, the federal courts may nevertheless look to the
general body of law established by the English courts and the states as evidence of
how Congress intended a particular statutory right to be enforced."6
On the other hand, delegation need not always be directly linked to a
substantive right created by Congress. The Supreme Court's most notorious-and
potentially most expansive-delegation decision is Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills. 6' The particular federal statute in Lincoln Mills merely gave the federal
courts jurisdiction over certain labor contracts.'62 The Supreme Court nevertheless
concluded that when it granted jurisdiction, Congress also delegated to the courts
the power to create a body of federal substantive law to be used in cases decided
158. 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
159. Id. at 569, 102 S. Ct. at 1944. In two other cases decided during the same period, Texas
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981), and Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981), the Court refused to impose
secondary liability. The Court distinguished those cases from American Society ina way that is directly
pertinent to the thesis of this article. In both Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines, Congress had
created an entirely new cause of action that had no close historical analogue. Because of the suigeneris
nature of the new substantive right, the Court refused to assume that Congress meant for the courts to
augment the right by applying traditional principles of secondary liability. The Court was willing to
make that assumption, however, in a case like American Society, where Congress created a cause of
action similar to those that existed at common-law.
160. Federal courts will not always borrow from the general law when interpreting federal statutes.
In DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S. Ct. 974 (i 956), the Court had to determine the meaning
of the term "children" in the federal copyright laws. The Court turned to state law for that definition.
Because the states bear primary responsibility for laws regulating the family, the Court held that federal
courts should use those state definitions rather than develop their own rule.
161. 353 U.S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912 (1957).




under that jurisdiction."e Thus, the federal court did not have to rely on state
law. ' Although no other case has gone quite this far, neither the holding nor the.
rationale of Lincoln Mills has ever been denounced by the Court.
2. Applying These Principles to Equity
a. Delegation
Given that no federal statute currently in force' 5 contains language that even
remotely resembles an explicit delegation of authority to create a general body of
federal equitable law, implied delegation is the only possibility.'" The first step
in the search for an implied delegation is to pinpoint the federal statute that serves
as Congress's vehicle for delegation. When Congress has created a new
substantive right enforceable in a federal court of equity, the statute creating that
right is the obvious candidate. But as Lincoln Mills demonstrates, courts will
sometimes imply a delegation from a statute that does not create new rights.
Because these two situations involve significantly different considerations, each
will be addressed separately.
i. Claims Based on a Federal Statute
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Holmberg v. Armbrecht 7 that
federal courts need not apply state equity law to claims arising under a federal
statute. The rationale of York, the Court reasoned, was inapposite when Congress
163. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57,77 S. Ct. at 917-18.
164. Id.
165. The Conformity Act, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 24 to 27, arguably gave the
federal courts lawmaking authority in equity. That statute remained in force until 1948. At the time
of the 1945 York decision, it read:
The forms of mesne process and the forms and modes of proceedings in equity and of
admiralty jurisdiction in the district courts shall be according to the principles, rules, and
usages which belong to courts of equity and of admiralty, respectively, except when it is
otherwise provided by statute or by rules of court made in pursuance thereof; but the same
shall be subject to alteration and addition by the said courts, respectively, and to
regulation by the Supreme Court, by rules prescribed, from time to time, to any district
court, not inconsistent with the laws of the*United States.
28 U.S.C. § 723 (1948) (emphasis added). The italicized clause explicitly grants rulemaking authority
to the federal courts.
Of course, as that statute is no longer in force, it is of little use in supporting a federal common law
of equity today. Moreover, even it were still in force, the Conformity Act could not serve as the
foundation of a broad law of equity. The statute dealt only with the "process and the forms and modes
of proceedings." Although this might support equitable procedural rules, it would not justify a separate
federal set of remedies or equitable causes of action.
166. Of course, many federal statutes explicitly authorize equitable remedies such as injunctions
in connection with particular causes of action. However, there is no general federal statute that explicitly
gives the federal courts the power to grant equitable remedies in all cases within their jurisdiction.
167. 327 U.S. 392, 66 S. Ct. 582 (1946).
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created the substantive right.16  Notwithstanding the significant development in
Erie jurisprudence since Holmberg, the holding of that case has remained largely
unchallenged. Lower federal courts have applied federal equity rules to claims
based on-a federal statute with little concern for any Erie implications.'69 Federal
law clearly governs remedies. However, it may also apply to other matters. For
example, federal courts routinely invoke the equitable defenses of laches and
unclean hands when deciding whether equitable relief is available for a federal
statutory claim, unless that defense interferes with Congress's purpose.' The
Supreme Court has also held that federal courts may graft ancillary, traditionally
equitable, substantive rights such as contribution and indenmity onto federal
statutory rights, as long as doing so would not undermine Congress's intent."'
These cases are entirely consistent with Erie. Erie does not require a federal
court to apply state law when there is valid federal law on point. The body of
uniform equity rules that federal courts use in connection with federal statutory
rights is legitimate federal law because it is created either by Congress itself or by
the federal courts acting pursuant to a delegation of Congress's power.
To illustrate, consider what occurs when a new federal statutory right comes
into being. Congress's power to create that substantive right includes the power
to specify how that right will be enforced. However, Congress rarely drafts
detailed rules governing every step of the enforcement process. Instead, it typically
builds upon existing concepts, including the well-developed body of equity law.
Suppose, for example, that Congress creates a new statutory right, and
specifies that a party who proves a violation of that right may obtain an injunction.
Notwithstanding that straightforward language, courts will not grant an injunction
merely upon a showing that the right has been violated. Instead, they will analyze
several additional factors, such as public policy, adequacy of alternate common-law
relief, and whether the defendant is guilty of laches or unclean hands, even though
the statute makes no mention of these factors. When it included a term of art like
"injunction" in its statute, the courts reason, Congress intended that the courts
would interpret that term in light of well-established principles of equity."' As the
168. Id. at 395, 66 S. Ct. at 584.
169. CIA Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985) (historic
principles of equity govern whether an injunction is available in antitrust action); Remlinger v. Nevada,
896 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Nev. 1995) (uses basic principles of equity in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) action).
170. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,115 S. CL 879(1995), the Court
refused to allow an unclean hands defense because it found that the private right created by the federal
statute served an important federal policy. Absent such considerations, however, federal courts typically
do apply the doctrines of laches and unclean hands in federal question cases where the plaintiff seeks
equitable relief. See, e.g., Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1992) (copyright infringement); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh g denied, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30957 (counterclaim of copyright misuse); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309 (9th
Cir. 1997) (trademark infringement); Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir.
1996) (false advertising and misrepresentation under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)).
171. American Soc'y of Mechanical Engrs. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982).
172. Many statutes make this clear, e.g., by expressly providing for an injunction or accounting
"subject to the principles of equity," or with similar limiting language. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1116
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Supreme Court stated in Holmberg, "When Congress leaves to the federal courts
the formulation of remedial details, it-can hardly expect them to break with historic
principles of equity in the enforcement of federally-created rights.""'
Of course, all states have their own established principles of equity, which
often differ in their particulars. But Congress did not intend for its new statutory
right to incorporate the idiosyncracies of any single state's law. Borrowing
individual state rules of equity would lead to unequal enforcement of the federal
right across the nation, which would usually frustrate Congress's intent. "' Instead,
the equitable principles that Congress had in mind when it enacted the legislation
are those traditional principles inherited from England. Those traditional principles
constitute a separate federal judge-made law of equity that applies in lieu of an
individual state's laws in cases involving the federal statutory right.'
If a federal court were simply divining the meaning of a particular word or
phrase in a statute, the conclusion that state law does not control is hardly
controversial. Even though it produces binding precedent, statutory interpretation
is not the same as true judicial lawmaking. "6 However, a federal court's power in
equity may go well beyond interpretation. Supplementing a statutory cause of
action with an ancillary right such as contribution, for example, clearly involves
more than interpreting Congress's wording. As Congress likely never considered
these questions, the courts in these cases are actually making law.
(1994) ("according to the principles of equity); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) ("in accordance with the
principles of equity"). Even when Congress omits such a proviso, courts apply generally-accepted
principles of equity law. For example, even though the Copyright Act's injunction provision, 17 U.S.C.
§ 502 (1994), contains no reference to basic principles of equity, courts routinely consider the historic
factors when determining whether to grant injunctions. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988) (balance of hardships); New Era Publications Int'l v.
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), reh 'g denied, 884 F.2d 659, cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1094, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990) (laches). Courts take a similar approach under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1999). Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). In all of these cases, it
would frustrate Congress's intent if the federal court were to decide whether to grant an injunction by
applying principles that varied greatly from the traditional rules.
173. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,395, 66 S. Ct. 582, 584 (1946).
174. Admittedly, federal courts adjudicating claims arising under a federal statute will sometimes
"borrow" the controlling rule from state law. See. e.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S. Ct.
974 (1956) (state law determines meaning of term "children" in Copyright Act). However, the situation
described in the text is qualitatively different than that in DeSylva. In DeSyiva, Congress had grafted
additional rights onto a state-law foundation, by allowing the federal copyright to pass to the author's
children. Because the definition of a family could vary from state to state, Congress was willing to
allow the ancillary federal right to vary accordingly. Most new rights that Congress creates, however,
do not build upon a state-law base, and should accordingly be interpreted uniformly across the nation.
175. Except in the rare case where Congress vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, state
courts may also hear claims arising under federal law. Because a uniform national rule is necessary to
effectuate Congress's intent, state courts in these cases should also apply the federal judge-made law
of equity instead of state law.
176. But see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 Mich. L Rev. 311 (1980) (contend that the difference between judicial lawmaking and
stLtutory interpretation is one of degree, not kind).
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This judge-made federal law is valid because it is promulgated pursuant to
authority delegated by Congress. Rather than deciding for itself how the statute
should be enforced, Congress left that issue to the courts. However, the courts do
not have free rein to enforce the right however they might see fit. First, they are
obligated to enforce it in a way that best carries out Congress's intent. Second, as
in the case of statutory interpretation, the courts are bound by the "backdrop" of the
historic rules and limits of equity. Congress was willing to let the federal courts
work out the details of how a right would be enforced only if the courts worked
within well-established principles already familiar to Congress. As in statutory
interpretation, these guiding principles are the general rules inherited from English
Chancery, not the modem variants in force in a state that happens to have some
connection to the case.
A federal statute may delegate the power to create rules of equity even when
it does not explicitly authorize equitable relief. Many federal statutes create
obligations, but do not provide details on how that obligation should be enforced.
In these cases, a federal court may assume that Congress has delegated the task of
determining what remedies are appropriate to enforce the new right. Those
remedies often include equitable relief.'" As long as the federal court acts within
the historic limits of equity, it is irrelevant whether the remedy it chooses is
available under state law. Congress's decision to allow its new right to be
adjudicated in federal courts is an implied delegation of authority for that court to
invoke its traditional equitable discretion.
Overall, then, there is a considerable body of federal equity law that applies
in cases involving federal statutory rights. Federal statutes are enacted against a
backdrop of case law, including the historic principles that governed equity. In
addition to guiding a court when it interprets a statute, those principles define a
court's power to make rules to "fill the gaps" in the federal statute. As long as the
court observes these guidelines, its gap-filling rules are valid, binding federal law,
and are accordingly immune from Erie.
ii. Other Cases
Although it works quite well for federal statutory claims, the implied
delegation argument is much weaker in cases where Congress did not create the
substantive right. Congress delegates its legislative powers by statute. Had
Congress intended to give the federal courts general lawmaking powers in equity,
177. Deckert v. Independant Shares Corp.. 311 U.S. 282, 61 S. Ct. 229 (1940) (Court grants
injunction even though federal securities laws do not explicitly authorize one); West Presbyterian
Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D. Cal. 1994), appeal dismissed, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5085 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same result under Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-I (Supp. 1999)); Areizaga v. Quern, 442 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. IIl. 1977), a fd, 590 F.2d 226
(7th Cir. 1978) (same under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); Washington v. CSC Cred. Servs., 180 F.R.D.
309 (E.D. La. 1998) (same under Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (1994)); but see
Sibley y. Fulton DeKalb Collection Serv., 677 F.2d 830 (11 th Cir. 1982) (federal court has no power




it would have enacted a statute that applies to all equity cases that could be heard
in federal court. The only statutes that come even close to meeting this requirement
are the provisions granting the federal courts jurisdiction in equity." Therefore,
the argument for an implied delegation in cases that do not involve a federal
statutory right turns on whether the Lincoln Mills theory, under which a grant of
jurisdiction includes a delegation of lawmaking power, can be applied to equity.'"
Extending Lincoln Mills to federal equity would clearly extend that theory
beyond its breaking point. The jurisdictional statute involved in that case was a far
cry from the broad grant of jurisdiction that Congress has given to the federal
courts in equity. The statute in Lincoln Mills specifically applied only to labor
contracts.8 0 Because labor contracts unquestionably affect interstate commerce,
Congress itself would have had the authority to enact any of the substantive rules
of contract law that a court might create when hearing a case under that jurisdic-
tional statute.' Equally important, Congress could also overturn by statute any
judge-made rule with which it disagreed.
The situation in equity is fundamentally different. Even assuming that
Congress did intend the grant of diversity jurisdiction to include a delegation of
lawmaking power in equity,'82 that delegation would face serious constitutional
problems. Congress cannot delegate authority it does not have., None of
Congress's enumerated powers, even when augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause,'" are broad enough to cover the entire set of substantive rules that
comprise the law of equity. Congress certainly has no general power to regulate
what remedies are available in cases arising under state law, even when those
remedies are heard in federal court.' Although a delegation pursuant to the
178. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1994).
179. Lincoln Mills is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 161 to 164.
180. The statute involved was Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994).
181. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Although performance under a labor contract may be entirely within the confines of one state, that
contract undoubtedly has a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to fit within the commerce clause.
182. Even that basic assumption is unrealistic. The idea that Congress meant for its grant of
jurisdiction in equity to include a delegation of lawmaking power is inconsistent with the language of
the statutes it enacted. Section 1332, the general diversity statute, does give the federal courts a general
equity jurisdiction over non-federal claims. However, that statute applies to all "civil actions,"
including actions at common law. Therefore, if Congress meant for the general diversity statute to
delegate lawmaking authority, the natural conclusion is that it did so in both common law and equity.
That conclusion is clearly undermined by Erie.
183. Admittedly, Congress may allocate the federal judicial power-a power that Congress itself
cannot exercise-to the lower federal courts. However, there is a difference between delegation and
Congress's unique power to control the situations in which the lower federal courts may exercise their
constitutional authority.
184. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
185. In the case of a state-law cause of action, it is theoretically possible that the state legislature
may have intended to delegate its legislative authority. At present, it is unclear whether a state could
delegate lawmaking authority to the federal courts. But even if it could, such a delegation would not
avoid the Erie problem. If a state legislature delegated to the courts the authority to fill gaps in its
statutes, its intent would undoubtedly be to have those gaps filled with the judge-made law of that state,
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jurisdiction statutes would give the federal courts in equity the power to create any
law that Congress itself could have enacted, including rules governing procedure,"8'
such delegation could not sustain most of the federal judge-made rules dealing with
equitable remedies and defenses.
In short, then, delegation does support some federal judge-made law in equity.
The Rules Enabling Act applies to equity as Well as common-law, and can support
procedural rules like Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62 and 65. Moreover, there
is an implied delegation of legislative power to apply a federal judge-made law of
equity in connection with rights created by Congress. In the typical diversity case,
however, the delegation argument is of no avail. Not only is there no evidence that
Congress meant to delegate lawmaking authority,"' but any such delegation would
be limited to rules that Congress itself could enact. If a federal court has the
authority to craft a general body of independent federal equity rules for non-
statutory cases, it must be because equity fits into the other category of substantive
federal judge-made law: where the federal court has the inherent authority to create
law.
b. Inherent Authority
Most of the Supreme Court cases recognizing substantive federal judge-made
law involve no delegation from Congress. These cases proceed from the premise
not an independent federal law.
186. The Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965),
holds that Congress's power to regulate federal procedure is greater than a 'federal court's inherent
power. Under Hanna, a federal judge-made rule of procedure is invalid if it leads to forum-shopping
for a different outcome. Id. at 468, 85 S. Ct. at 1142. If the court acts pursuant to a delegation from
Congress, however, its rule is valid as long as it fits within the scope of the delegation, even if it might
lead to forum-shopping. id. at 471, 85 S. Ct. at 1144. As Congress can delegate only those powers that
it itself could exercise, Congress itself must have the power to enact "procedural" rules that might
change the result and lead to forum shopping.
187. In hindsight, it is not surprising that there is no real evidence ofan implied delegation. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted almost exactly 150 years before Erie. At that time, it would have
been nonsensical to speak of equitable rules as a body of'Judge-made law." The notion that rules set
out in precedent are merely another form ofpositive law is the product of a paradigm shift that began
in the last half of the nineteenth century, and culminated in Erie.
In 1789, courts of both common law and equity believed in a transcendental "superlaw" that existed
in all common-law nations. Court decisions did not create this law, but rather merely provided evidence
of those unwritten rules. That transcendental, almost platonic Form of law evolved in England, was
transplanted to the colonies, and was inherited upon independence of the new United States. Therefore,
differences in the way an individual state court interpreted that law would be an aberration, not binding
upon any court except those inferior to that state court.
. It is clear from the very first Judiciary Act that Congress meant to have this universal law apply in
federal cases. Section I I of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the trial courts jurisdiction in "Law and
Equity" over cases involving parties ofdiverse citizenship. The very generality of this language reflects
the common view of a single body of equity law. Therefore, as reflected in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) I (1842), federal courts did not consider themselves bound to follow individual state variations
in the universal law.
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that notwithstanding Erie's condemnation of a federal general judge-made law,"'
there are certain specific areas in which federal courts do have the inherent
authority to create binding substantive law. If equity is one of these areas, federal
courts could apply a national law of equity even though some of the rules would
change the outcome of litigation.
At first glance, equity seems a far cry from the typical case in which the
Supreme Court has recognized federal substantive judge-made law. Although the
cases defy easy categorization, the vast majority involved, at least in the eyes of the
Court, a strong federal interest in the dispute. Accordingly, federal judge-made law
may apply when the United States is a party," 9 two states ask the Supreme Court
to settle a dispute,'" a party sues directly under the Constitution, 9' or when the
litigation threatens international relations 92 or some other significant federal policy
or project." 3 There is no comparable federal interest in equity cases that involve
state-law substantive rights. The federal government has no overwhelming concern
with what one private party must show to obtain an accounting of another private
party's profits, or whether a claimant has unclean hands. Given that Congress
would not even have the power to codify all of the rules of equity, it is difficult to
see how the federal government could claim any real interest in those rules.
Therefore, unless a given case involves some other federal interest, the mere fact
that a party seeks equitable relief instead of damages is not itself sufficient to
support the use of federal judge-made equitable rules..
There is, however, one category of substantive federal judge-made law that
does not fit the standard mold. The substantive law of admiralty and maritime is
federal judge-made law.'" Where federal courts derive their authority to develop
that law is less clear. Although there is an ostensible federal interest in navigation,
the Court has not invoked that interest in sustaining federal judicial authority.
Instead, the Court has indicated that the courts' lawmaking authority stems directly
from the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of Article III. In 1874, the Supreme
Court held that Article III's reference to admiralty and maritime cases not only
authorized federal judicial jurisdiction, but also provided a body of substantive law
for the courts to apply:
188. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
189. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580.93 S. Ct. 2389 (1973); Howard
v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593,79 S. Ct. 1331 (1959); Clearfield Trust v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 67 S.
Ct. 573 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 62 S. Ct. 910
(1942).
190. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,92 S. Ct. 1385 (1972).
191. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,91
S. Ct. 1999 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442.U.S. 228,99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 100 S. Ct. 1468 (1980). It is not clear why the Court deems the judge-made law in this area
"federal." Although federal courts do have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the
Constitution, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), the Constitution itself is not a"federal" document, but instead
a national one.
192. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964).
193. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
194. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S. Ct. 886 (1961); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959).
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That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United
States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was
familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution
was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to when it was
declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' 5
Federal courts in admiralty and maritime were to apply the basic rules of admiralty
and maritime law shared by commercial nations. " Moreover, the Court indicated
that this national law applied in lieu of state law whenever the two differed. 9"
The Court has reaffirmed this basic principle several times, both before and
after Erie.'" In 1959, for example, the Court in Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co.'" explained in more modem parlance how Article III affected the
substantive law in admiralty and maritime:
Article III impliedly contained three grants. (1) It empowered Congress
to confer admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the "Tribunals inferior
to the Supreme Court" which were authorized by Art. I, §8, cl. 9. (2) It
empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred upon them, to draw upon
the substantive law "inherent in the admiralty jurisdiction," Crowell v.
Benson, and to continue the development of this law within constitutional
limits. (3) It empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime
law within the limits of the Constitution.2"
In essence, Article III incorporated a basic set of legal principles for courts to use
in admiralty and maritime cases.2"'
The quoted passage from Romero bears a striking resemblance to the
nineteenth century equity cases discussed in Part I.A. Those cases indicate that
195. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574 (1874).
196. The Court in The Lonawanna indicated that the courts were not necessarily to apply the
specific rules used in the English courts, but were instead to apply the basic principles of admiralty law
shared by all western nations. Those basic principles, not the specific rules of English law, were
adopted by the United States upon independence. Id. at 576.
197. "One thing... is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of
law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not
have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and
regulation of the several states ....
Id. at 575.
198. See, e.g., Kossick. 365 U.S. 731,81 S. Ct. 886 (1961); The Western Maid v. Thompson, 257
U.S. 419, 42 S. Ct. 449 (1922); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524 (1917).
199. 358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468 (1959).
200. Id. at 360-61,79 S. Ct. at 473-74 (1959).
201. The reference to "Constitutional limits" in the quoted passage is unclear. That term could
refer to other limits that the Constitution places on the federal government, such as those set out in the
Bill of Rights. On the other hand, it could refer to the historic parameters of admiralty, which define
the areas in which the federal court has the constitutional authority to make law.
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federal courts in equity apply those "historic principles established in English
Chancery."2 2 This similarity between the admiralty and equity cases makes it
tempting to conclude that federal courts also have an inherent power to decide
equity cases using a national body of law borrowed from England. In other words,
just as the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in Article I empowers
federal courts to "draw upon the substantive law inherent in" that jurisdiction, the
grant of equity jurisdiction in the same Article might empower them to draw upon
the substantive law inherent in equity when deciding equity cases. ' 3
Upon closer scrutiny, however, a direct analogy to admiralty fails. The
argument that a federal court can apply federal substantive law whenever it sits in
equity is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic premise of Erie. After all, the
provision of Article III that allows federal courts to sit in equity also grants
jurisdiction over common-law cases. Erie and the later cases make it clear that
notwithstanding Article III's reference to common law, there is no general common
law for the federal courts to apply in diversity cases.
The situation in admiralty and maritime is quite different. First, that is a
discrete and narrow pocket of law. Even if federal courts may ignore state law in
admiralty and maritime cases, they remain bound to defer to state authority in the
more common diversity case. Second, and more importantly, the Article III
reference to admiralty and maritime essentially "federalized" that discrete area of
the law by augmenting both the judicial and the legislative powers of the federal
government. The above-quoted passage from Romero interpreted Article III's
admiralty and maritime clause not only as a grant ofjurisdiction, but also as a grant
of legislative power to Congress."' Article III's grant of common-law and equity
jurisdiction, by contrast, has never been interpreted to contain an ancillary grant of
legislative power to Congress. Nor will that clause ever be interpreted to include
lawmaking power, for if Congress could enact substantive law for all common-law
and equity cases, the Article I restrictions on Congress's power would be
effectively eviscerated. This difference between the admiralty/maritime and
diversity provisions in Article III is crucial in a post-Erie world, where both
legislation and precedent are treated as positive law, and accordingly are valid only
if the sovereign has legislative power over the subject of the law. It would
202. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105,65 S. Ct. 1464, 1467-68 (1945) ("The suits
in equity of which the federal courts have had 'cognizance' ever since 1789 constituted the body of law
which had been transplanted to this country from the English Court of Chancery."); Atlas Life Ins. Co.
v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563,568,59 S. Ct. 657,659-60 (1939); Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101,
114, 35 S. Ct. 526, 529-30 (1915); Thompson v. Railroad Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867);
Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648,658 (1832); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425,430 (1868);
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212,223 (1818). See also the extensive discussion in CIA
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985).
203. That Article III gives the federal courts potential jurisdiction over all admiralty and maritime
cases, while limiting jurisdiction in equity to cases that fall within one of Article Ill's other categories,
is of no significance. Even if federal courts may hear only some equity cases, they could still apply a
body of federal equitable rules to decide those cases. U.S. Const. art. Ill.
204. See supra text accompanying note 200.
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therefore be a serious blunder to conclude that the logic of the admiralty and
maritime cases applies to equity.
Under a standard analysis of federal judge-made law, then, it would seem that
federal courts have a very limited power to make rules of law in equity cases. First,
a federal court may always control its own procedure. Because most of the rules
of equity would lead to forum shopping, however, they are not procedural for
purposes of Erie. Second, when Congress creates a substantive right enforceable
in equity, it ordinarily delegates to the courts the authority to apply traditional
principles of equity in cases involving that right. No implied delegation, however
exists in the typical diversity case. Absent any basis for a substantive judge-made
law of equity, it may seem that Erie applies in equity to the same extent as it does
at common law, and requires federal courts hearing state-law claims to borrow state
equitable rules.
However, there is one more path to be explored. Although a direct analogy to
admiralty and maritime ultimately proves to be a dead end, that analysis reveals a
new source for federal judicial lawmaking power. The notion that federal judge-
made law can stem directly from Article III is actually quite useful. That concept
not only helps explain other aspects of federal judge-made law, most notably the
court's inherent power to regulate procedure, but also provides a new rationale for
judge-made rules in equity. The next section explores this line of reasoning.
Ill. ARTICLE III AS A SOURCE OF FEDERAL JUDGE-MADE LAW
As discussed in Part II.A. of this article, a federal court's inherent authority to
create rules of procedure is clearly established. Yet, although the Supreme Court
has devoted considerable attention to defining procedure, it has never disclosed the
source of the federal courts' authority to make procedural law. Read literally, Erie
indicates that federal courts have no lawmaking powers whatsoever. Therefore,
there must be something special about procedural rules to justify exempting then
from this general rule.
The simplest explanation is that a federal court's power to regulate judicial
procedure comes from the simple fact that it is a court. In the Anglo-American
tradition, a court is an organ of government with the power to decide disputes in
an organized fashion. To ensure that it can decide disputes fairly, a court has the
inherent power to control its own procedures. As the Supreme Court recently
stated in a case dealing with a court's inherent power to discipline attorneys:
It has long been understood that "certain implied powers must necessarily
result to our Courts of Justice from the nature of their institution," powers
"which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary
to the exercise of all others."... These powers are "governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases."
205
205. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1990).
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The Constitution itself makes it clear that federal courts are an integral part of
the federal government, and that they exercise part of the federal sovereign
authority. Article III deals with the "judicial Power of the United States," a
counterpart to the legislative and executive powers discussed in the first two
articles. Because the judicial power is a sovereign power, the actions of a court are
legally binding on individual litigants. The judicial power also includes a limited
authority to make rules of law governing how rights are to be adjudicated in the
federal courts.
The question, of course, is not whether a federal court has an innate lawmaking
authority, but the extent of that authority. To answer that question, it is necessary
to determine exactly how much lawmaking authority is contained in the Article III
judicial power. Unfortunately, there is little guidance on what "judicial power"
actually means. Although Article II goes into great detail about the areas in which
the federal courts may exercise the judicial power, it nowhere defines that crucial
phrase. Nor has the Supreme Court ever provided a precise definition.'
History, however, provides certain clues as to what the framers meant by
judicial power. The framers did not create federal court system out of whole cloth.
Instead, they borrowed many basic features from the English judicial system.
Although the federal courts were to enjoy a much higher degree of independence
from the legislative branch than their English counterparts, the basic way in which
rights were to be adjudicated was intended to be roughly the same. Therefore, one
can glean hints to what Article III means by judicial power by reviewing the
English practice. '
A. The English System: Different Courts with Different Roles
Obviously, an article of this scope cannot begin to explore the nuances of a
system as complicated as the English judicial system of the late eighteenth century.
Fortunately, an exhaustive analysis is not necessary. Although the framers of the
United States Constitution envisioned a federal court system constructed along the
same basic lines as the English, they did not necessarily intend to adopt all of the
particulars of that system. All this article need discuss, then, is the basic structure
of the English system.
206. The Court has occasionally had to interpret Article III when faced with federal statutes in
which Congress either attempts to exercise judicial-like functions or assigns those functions to non-
Article II courts, or when Congress gives the Article IIl courts the power to perform non-judicial
functions. For a sampling of the cases, see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429,112 S.
Ct. 1407 (1992); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986);
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982); Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660 (1944); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S.
Ct. 751 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 49 S. Ct. 411 (1929); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. (13 Otto) 168 (1881); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).




A central feature of the English system was the division of caseload among
several different courts, including the courts of common law, equity, and admiralty.
However, the subject-matter jurisdiction of these courts was not mutually
exclusive, as the same dispute could sometimes be presented to more than one
court. The overlap in jurisdiction was especially great between common law and
equity. Although at first this overlap gave claimants the ability to shop for the most
favorable result, the notorious Coke-Ellesmere controversy led to a royal decree in
1616 that gave precedence to law. From that point on, a party could proceed in
equity only by demonstrating that its remedy at common law was somehow
deficient.' °
Subject-matter jurisdiction was not the only matter that separated the English
courts of common law, equity, and admiralty. Each court also had its own
procedure. These differences in procedure became especially important after
equity became a fallback to common law. Equity's mode of adjudicating cases
would later give that system a unique role, and ultimately define the very nature of
equity.20
9
The common-law courts employed an extremely formalistic procedure, marked
by difficult rules of pleading and the rigidity of the writs. A party who failed to
follow the strict procedure often found his case dismissed on technical grounds.210
On the other hand, the common-law courts had considerable flexibility in defining
the underlying rights of the litigants. As long as the legislature had not spoken, a
common-law court could, when presented with a new type of case, define the rule
that determined if one party ought to be liable to the other.
In some ways the situation in equity was exactly the opposite. The main
feature of equity procedure was its flexibility. Pleading was not formalistic, but
was instead intended to provide notice to the other side.2"' Equity also employed
a number of procedural tools, such as discovery and the class action, which were
not available in common-law courts. 2 This flexibility in procedure often helped
parties who were hamstrung by the rigidity of common-law procedure. A party
could ordinarily proceed in equity merely by showing that procedural limitations
made the relief available at common law inadequate. Over time, procedural
flexibility and judicial discretion naturally became a defining feature of the equity
courts.
On the other hand, a court of equity had considerably less authority than its
common-law counterpart to mold the substantive law. Admittedly, equity did
develop a number of important substantive rights that did not exist at law, such as
208. J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 92-93 (2d ed. 1979).
209. .McClintock, supra note 91, at 49-52.
210. Baker, supra note 208, at 87-88.
211. Id. at 88.
212. See generally McClintock, supra note 91, at 20-45,110. Equity's relegation toa"failback"
role in 1616 hastened the development of these procedural tools. One way for equity to ensure itself
a continuing role was to make itself available when a party could not meet the inflexible requirements
of common law. Baker, supra note 208, at 88.
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the use, the trust, and the right to redeem collateral from a mortgagee."' Aside
from these rights, however, equity typically looked to the legislature and the
precedent of the common-law courts for the rules that established the relative legal
position of the litigants." 4 Equity instead used its discretion mainly to determine
whether it was just to enforce those legal rights in the circumstances of the actual
dispute.2 s
But even though equity did not generally create rights, its unique mode of
adjudicating cases often had the effect of strengthening or weakening existing
substantive rights. Equity could augment existing rights in several ways. For
example, a party whose legal rights had been violated might nevertheless find that
the facts of the case did not precisely fit any of the common-law writs. Even
though that party could not obtain relief at common law, he might in equity.216
Similarly, equity could often strengthen a legal right by providing a more effective
remedy, such as specific performance instead of damages for breach of a
contract.
217
On the other hand, equity's flexibility could also serve to weaken a party's
legal position. Even when equity relied on substantive rules established by a
legislature or in common law, it retained considerable discretion in deciding
whether that legal right should be enforced in the given case. Because equitable
relief was special, equity developed the "defenses" of laches and unclean hands,
which would lead courts of equity to deny relief even. when faced with a clear
violation of a substantive right. A party who was denied access to equity because
of laches or unclean hands could still sue in common law.2"' However, as
claimants sought relief in equity only when the relief available in common law was
in some way inadequate, use of an equitable defense significantly reduced the
effectiveness of the claimant's legal right.
At the risk of oversimplification, then, the "power" of the English judiciary in
equity comprised three separate elements. Like the common-law courts, courts of
equity could develop substantive rights and devise procedures to enforce those
rights. Courts of equity, however, had an extra power, the ability to exercise
discretion in determining whether and how to enforce a legal right. As common-
213. McClintock, supra note 91, at 5-9.
214. Dobbs, supra note 59, at 84 ("Equity courts never claimed the power to deny a plaintiff's legal
rights except by substantive defenses such as estoppel."); McClintock, supra note 91, at 53; Baker,
supra note 208, at 94.
215. Id.
216. McClintock, supra note 91, at 110.
217. Id. at 112-13.
218. Dobbs, supra note 59, at 68 (unclean hands), 76 (laches); Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, § 25 (1980), comment i(l) (indicates that a plaintiff whose common-law action was
dismissed could sue again in equity, stating, "This was true, for example, where the suit in equity was
dismissed because the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, or on the ground of such delay or
hardship or impropriety of the plaintiff's conduct as barred a suit in equity but not an action at law.")
Of course, plaintiff's right to sue again at common law was dependent on whether the statute of
limitations had expired.
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law courts had only a very limited discretion, discretion became a hallmark of the
separate system of equity.
B. Incorporating the English System into the United States Constitution
This basic model of separate courts traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to
England's North American colonies." 9 Although thirteen of these colonies threw
off the yoke of English sovereignty, they did not discard all English ways. When
the framers of the Constitution began to design a system of national courts, they
naturally used the English model. The federal courts were to be units of govem-
ment that exercised "judicial Power," one of the component parts of sovereign
authority. They could exercise that power in common law, equity, and admi-
ralty/maritime."2 When they divided the federal courts along the same lines as the
English system, the framers undoubtedly envisioned that each of the national courts
would function in the same basic way as the English counterpart. Federal courts
sitting in common law would continue, in the absence of legislation, to define
substantive rights. When sitting in equity, by contrast, the courts would serve
primarily as a fallback to common-law. Although generally deferring to common
law's interpretation of substantive rights, federal equity would, like its English
219. Not all of the colonies maintained separate courts of equity. Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S.(3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818). But all of the colonies allowed some court to issue injunctions and
adjudicate historically equitable rights and remedies. The addition of Louisiana, with its civil law
tradition, raised the additional problem of how the federal courts should deal with the absence of even
a law of equity, which was resolved in Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632,655 (1835). However,
as both the Louisiana Purchase and the admission of Louisiana as a state occurred well after the
Constitution was enacted, the state of the law in Louisiana should not affect how the Constitution is
interpreted.
220. One curious twist in the legislative history could suggest to the contrary. Early drafts of
Article III explicitly stated in Section I that the federal judicial power existed "both in law and equity."
The Committee on Style later deleted that phrase from Section 1, and included it in Section 2. William
M. Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution 240-41 (1987). Meigs suggests that the change was made
because the reference to equity was more properly dealt with in Section 2. Id. at 241.
However, there is an additional problem with the wording. As finally enacted, Article 1Il, section 2
specifically mentions "equity" only in connection with so-called "federal question" suits: "all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority." In the other eight categories, by contrast, Article IlI
does not mention equity. This phrasing could be interpreted to mean that federal courts may exercise
equitable discretion only in federal question cases.
That literal interpretation is hardly tenable. In fact, the remaining eight Article IlI categories mention
neither law nor equity; relying instead on the terms "all Cases" and "Controversies." Although this
omission makes sense in two of the categories, suits against the United States and admiralty and
maritime cases, which would in England have been litigated in neither courts of equity nor common-
law, it is difficult to imagine cases within some of the other categories, such as citizen-citizen diversity,
that would not fall into law or equity. Therefore, the most logical interpretation is that the omission of
"equity" does not preclude the federal courts from acting as courts of equity in the other categories. The
federal courts have never doubted their power to act in equity when sitting in diversity. Why the
framers chose to include the reference to law and equity for federal question suits but not the others may
remain a mystery forever.
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predecessor, provide relief from the rigidity of common law by exercising
discretion in procedure and remedies.
Of course, the Article III judicial power does not automatically vest in the
lower federal courts, but is allocated by Congress. The first Congress certainly
revised the English model. Instead of separate courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789
created a unitary court with separate heads ofjurisdiction. Congress also restricted
common-law's powers by the Rules of Decision Act,' which required those courts
to look to state law for substantive rules.
However, the first Congress did little to affect the basic role of equity. It gave
the federal courts expansive jurisdiction over diversity cases in both common law
and equity.222  Aside from the procedure acts discussed above2' and other
incidental restrictions on the judicial power in equity, Congress has maintained a
broad federal equity jurisdiction to this day.2" The fact that equity jurisdiction has
continued for so long a period is a clear indication that Congress is comfortable
with the current system, in which federal courts perform the same functions as the
English equity system.
History continues to play an important part in defining the role of the federal
courts in equity. Although a federal court may exercise discretion in determining
how to enforce a substantive right, its discretionary power exists only with respect
to matters that traditionally could have been heard in a court of equity. For a
federal court to exercise similar discretion in either a common-law or admiralty
matter would exceed not only the authority delegated by Congress, but also the
judicial power authorized by Article III. Thus, unless Congress sets up a different
system, history continues both to define the powers of the federal courts and to
limit the cases in which they may exercise those powers.
C. Erie and the Article III Judicial Power
If Article Ill itself gives federal courts certain lawmaking powers in equity, it
is tempting to conclude that Erie simply does not apply. Erie requires the federal
courts to follow state law whenever that law deals with a matter outside the limited
sovereignty of the federal government. However, those federalism concerns do not
exist if the Constitution extends federal sovereignty to a certain matter. When the
states ratified the Constitution, they conveyed some of their authority to the federal
government. Part of the authority they conveyed was a judicial power in equity.
Therefore, the argument continues, any federal judge-made law promulgated
221. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
222. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 78 (1789).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 21 to 27.
224. One example of a restriction on the equity powers of the federal courts is the "Anti-injunction
Act," 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994), which forbids federal courts from enjoining ongoing state judicial
proceedings, unless Congress has explicitly authorized injunctive relief, or the injunction is necessary
for federal jurisdiction. Other restrictions include: 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (district courts may not
enjoin assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes); 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988) (district courts may not
enjoin state rate-making orders); and the Norris-LaGuadia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (limits use of
injunctions in resolving labor disputes).
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pursuant to the judicial power is valid, and can be applied in lieu of state law. If
the states ceded lawmaking power to the federal courts, they cannot later insist that
the federal courts refrain from exercising it.
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much. Article In1 gives
the federal courts judicial power in both equity and common law. Among the
historic powers of the English judiciary, in both common law and equity, was the
ability to declare the content of the substantive law in the absence of legislation.
Erie clearly takes that power away from the federal courts when they sit in common
law. There is no reason to think.that the effect of Erie should be any different in
equity.
Viewed in this light, one important, but generally overlooked effect of Erie is
that it reinterprets Article III. At Erie's core is the notion that what we commonly
call judicial interpretation is in truth "lawmaking." Even though such lawmaking
was a traditional function of English and colonial courts, federalism and separation
of powers concerns prevent federal courts from making substantive law, except on
matters uniquely federal. Thus, Erie diminishes the scope of the federal judicial
power. Today, the judicial power does not include the traditional power of Anglo-
American courts to define substantive rights.
However, Erie does not entirely strip the federal courts of their power to make
law. A federal court's inherent authority to regulate its own procedure, recognized
in York and the later cases, remains an important incident of the judicial power. As
a result, the only lawmaking power that Erie took away from the federal courts was
the ability to define the substantive rights and duties of the litigants. Those courts
retain all other traditionally judicial powers granted by Article III.
From this perspective, Erie's impact is much greater in common law than in
equity. The most important discretionary power of the common-law court was its
ability to define the content of law. Although those courts often controlled their
own procedure, the rigid common-law procedural system left ajudge little room for
discretion. Once Erie took away the power to define legal rights, the discretionary
power of the federal courts in purely common-law matters was diminished
significantly.
Erie's impact in equity is not nearly as pervasive. Like common law, federal
courts in equity lost the power to define substantive rights, but retained the power
to regulate procedure. However, as equity typically already looked to other sources
for the substantive rules," the loss of the power to make substantive law is not as
significant.
But there was a third element to equity-the power to exercise discretion in
enforcing substantive rights. The rules that define this discretion are neither
procedural nor substantive, but fall somewhere between the two. Like procedural
rules, the rules governing equitable discretion take the basic legal relationship of
the parties as a given. The court limits its discretion to the question of how best to
enforce those underlying substantive rights. As long as it does not restructure the
basic legal relationship, a federal court employing traditional equitable discretion
225. See supra note 214.
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does not raise the constitutional issues that underlie the Erie decision. The exercise
of discretion in determining how a right should be enforced in a given context is
an inherently judicial function, not a legislative one. In that respect, it fits well
with the actual language used in Article III. Moreover, this exercise of discretion
raises none of the federalism concerns underlying Erie. Allowing federal courts
to exercise independent judgement when they perform this judicial function in no
way disrupts the Constitution's allocation of legislative power between the federal
and state governments. 2 6 Because Erie does not deprive a federal court of its
traditional power to exercise discretion in matters involving whether and how a
substantive right should be enforced, federal judge-made rules governing equitable
discretion are exempt from Erie.
In fact, a 1996 Supreme Court decision clearly indicates that a federal court in
equity may invoke historical equitable discretion in deciding whether to enforce a
state-law substantive right. Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.27 involved a
suit by the California insurance commissioner against Allstate to recover insurance
proceeds. After the case was removed to federal court, the district court invoked
Burford abstention22 and remanded the action to the state court.
The Supreme Court held that abstention was improper. Rather than focusing
on the elements of Burford abstention, however, the Court's reasoning focused on
the fact that the commissioner had sued for damages. Abstention, the Court held,
was available only when the plaintiff sought equitable or other discretionary relief.
The crucial portion of the Court's opinion relies heavily on the special powers of
courts in equity:
Our longstanding application of [the abstention] doctrines reflects "the
common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdic-
tion were enacted,".... It has long been established that a federal court
has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it "is asked
to employ its historic powers as a court of equity." This tradition informs
226. In addition to the obvious federalism issues, there are also separation of powers concerns
underlying Erie. After all, federal judge-made law is invalid even if it involves a topic within
Congress's Article I powers. According to the Erie Court, choosing a rule to decide a case in the
absence of a controlling statute was merely another form of law-making. Because the Constitution vests
the legislative power in Congress, not the courts, federal judge-made law also ran afoul of the
Constitution's separation of sovereign powers among the three branches. That violation of separation
of powers was of concern not only to Congress, but also to the states. Although the states may have
been willing to hand over son of their lawmaking power to an elected Congress, they did not agree to
let federal judges, who are appointed rather than elected, exercise that power.
The "judicial power" theory of this article also provides an adequate answer to these separation of
powers concerns. The crux of the theory is that when the Constitution was enacted, courts of equity had
certain limited powers to make binding rules. This rule-making authority was a widely recognized facet
of equity. Therefore, when the states agreed to a federal court system with jurisdiction in equity, they
could anticipate that the judicial power of those federal courts would encompass the same sorts of
judge-made equitable rules.
227. 517 U.S. 706, 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996).
228. Burfordabstention, named after Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,319 U.S. 315,63 S. Ct. 1098 (1943),
is where a federal court abstains because the state had established complex administrative procedures
to deal with the same dispute.
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our understanding of the jurisdiction Congress has conferred upon the
federal courts, and explains the development of our abstention doctrines.
In Pullman, for example, we explained the principle underlying our
abstention doctrines as follows:
The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
the injunction.... These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention
appropriate to our federal system, whereby the federal courts,
"exercising a wide discretion," restrain their authority...
Cases like Quackenbush confirm that there is indeed an "equity exception" to
Erie. As in common law, courts of equity must defer to Congress and the states in
determining whether a legal right exists. When a party seeks to enforce that right
in federal equity, however, the court has considerable discretion in determining
how that right can best be effectuated. That discretion is part of the judicial power
assigned to the federal courts by Article III of the Constitution."o Because the
authority stems from the Constitution, a federal court's use of equitable discretion
is governed not by state law, but by uniform national rules that originated in
England and are fleshed out in federal precedent. That federal precedent makes up
the federal judge-made law of equity.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE EQUITY EXCEPTION TO ERIE
Although history and the language of the Constitution support a general equity
exception to Erie, neither provides many details about how that exception applies
to particular rules of equity. Equity is, after all, a multifaceted area of law. Among
other things, equity has rules governing joinder, pleading, remedies, special
defenses, and causes of action. Because some of these rules may create or destroy
substantive rights, some may be invalid after Erie. Lower courts will face the task
of determining which of equity's many rules fall within the exception, and which
must give way to state law because of Erie. Nevertheless, while an article of this
229. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 717-18, 116 S. Ct. at 1721. The Court went on to explain that
abstention would be available not only in cases seeking equitable remedies, but also in other cases
where the court was called upon to exercise broad discretion. Id. at 718, 116 S. Ct. at 1721-22.
Whether discretionary legal remedies like mandamus are also exempt from Erie is beyond the scope
of this article.
230. Because equitable rules stem from the judicial power, it is irrelevant whether Congress would
also have the constitutional power to enact such rules. Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's bold dictum
in Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818 (1824), that "the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, of every well constructed governmnt, are coextensive with each other,"
the judicial and legislative powers of the federal government are r.ot coextensive. Although Congress
has no authority to pass a general code of laws that covers every possible dispute that might arise
between people of diverse citizenship, the federal courts have undisputed jurisdiction to adjudicate all
of these disputes. Therefore, a federal court may perform a judicial function regardless of whether
Congress could itself perform the same function. All that matters is that the action fits within the




scope cannot cover all of the particulars, it can provide some observations about
the scope of the equity exception.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that acknowledging the existence
of an equity exception has very little effect on Supreme Court precedent. Those
cases discussing a federal court's power to regulate its own procedure remain valid,
and continue to apply both in common law and equity.23" ' Likewise, the equity
exception affects neither a federal court's power to craft substantive law in certain
narrow areas 2 2 nor Congress's ability to delegate legislative powers to the
judiciary. 1 3 The equity exception is a separate and distinct area inwhich federal
courts may diverge from state law.
Like the other areas of federal judge-made law, the equity exception has limits.
First, it is, of course, confined to equity. That limitation is not as straightforward
as it may seem. A matter can be deemed "equitable" for a number of different
reasons, not all of which involve the remedy sought by the claimant. Moreover, the
domain of equity is not static, but has changed considerably over time. As
demonstrated above, applying the equity exception requires a court to consult
history in an attempt to ascertain equity's domain in the late eighteenth century.
A second, equally important limit on the equity exception is that it does not
allow a court to reshape to any significant extent the substantive rights of the
litigants. This limitation is not historical, but is a direct result of Erie. Therefore,
even when it applies an historic rule of equity, a federal court exceeds its
constitutional authority if it creates new substantive rights or negates basic rights
created by either Congress or the states.
The remainder of this article attempts to apply these guidelines and thereby
clarify the scope of the equity exception. Part A explores the external limitations
on a federal court's power that are imposed by both history and Congress. Part B
explores where the line lies between permissible use of equitable discretion and
impermissible restructuring of substantive rights. Resolving these major issues
should help the lower courts in their inevitable task of fleshing out the equity
exception.
A. Limitations on the Exception
The equity exception was first recognized in the majority opinion in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York. 4 That opinion actually provides certain clues as to how far the
exception extends. In the key passage quoted earlier,"s the majority suggested that
a federal court's power to create a uniform national law of equity was bound by the
231. See. e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965); Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, I 16 S. Ct. 2211 (1996); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
76 S. Ct. 273 (1956).
232. A federal court's inherent power to create substantive law is discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 188 to 201.
233. Delegation is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 145 to 148, and 158 to 164.
234. 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
235. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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Constitution, the historical limits on equity, and any additional limits imposed by
Congress.
The first limit is obvious. A federal court's power to enjoin speech, for
example, may be restricted by the first amendment. Likewise, as the seventh
amendment requirement of a jury in suits at common law has ben interpreted to
extend to cases involving a mixture of legal and equitable claims' and even some
cases that would historically have been purely equitable, 7 a federal court must
provide a jury notwithstanding that historically the judge would have served as
factfmder. Even though the judicial power of Article III provides the federal
judiciary some of the powers of a court of equity, these later and more specific
limits on the federal courts take precedence over the general delegation of judicial
power.
The other two limitations suggested in York are not as immediately obvious.
English practice normally carries little weight in interpreting the United States
Constitution. Similarly, because of the well-developed idea of separation of
powers, it is not immediate!y clear how Congress can regulate the exercise of
judicial power. Nevertheless, the suggestion in York that a federal court's power
in equity is subject to history and Congress is completely consistent with the notion
that the equity exception originates in Article III.
1. The Relevance of History
History is important not because it somehow overrides the Constitution, but
because it helps clarify the meaning of Article Ill. It has already been demon-
strated how the framers intended to structure the federal courts along the same lines
as the English court system."5 Article III's grant of "judicial power" included,
among other things, the special power of a court of equity to exercise discretion
when adjudicating substantive legal rights. By ratifying a provision that gave the
federal judiciary equity jurisdiction in diversity cases, the states agreed that federal
courts would have this discretion even when they dealt with cases arising under
state law.
The states may have agreed to this provision because the system of equity that
they had in mind had certain historical limits. In English practice, equity's
discretion was limited in two basic ways. The first was jurisdictional. 9 Many
cases, including those in which effective relief could be obtained in common law,
could not be heard in a court of equity. Of course, if a court of equity could not
even hear the case, it would have no opportunity to exercise its discretion. Second,
even when equity had jurisdiction, it could exercise its discretion only in certain
.236. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S. Ct. 948 (1959).
237. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S. Ct. 894 (1962).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 219 to 224.
239. "Equity jurisdiction" is more than merely a sub-class of subject-matter jurisdiction. As the
passage fromAtlas Life quoted supra at text accompanying note 74, "equityjurisdiction" includes not
only the raw power to hear a dispute, but also defined the sorts of cases in which the courts could
exercise their discretion in deciding that case. See also McClintock, supra note 91, at 97-99.
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ways. Because "equity follows the law,"' courts of equity generally could not
ignore the existence or non-existence of the legal rights claimed by the plaintiff.
Its discretion was generally limited to the issue of how that right should best be
enforced.
Those same historic principles limit the equity exception. For example,
because a suit seeking damages for breach of contract could not have been heard
in English Chancery, a federal court has no discretion to ignore state law governing
damages."4 If the plaintiff in that case instead sought specific performance, the
suit would be in equity, but the federal court's discretion would extend only to
matters involving enforcement, not to the core issues of whether a contract existed
and was breached. These core issues continue to be governed by state law.
Of course, it can be difficult for the modem court or attorney to ascertain the
historic scope of equity. The American judicial systemhas experienced monumen-
tal changes since 1800; changes that have erased many of the differences between
the two systems. 42 As a result, the traditional distinctions between common law
and equity are to most people a dim and distant memory. Nevertheless, because
these historic differences determine the scope of the federal court's power to apply
a uniform national rule of equity, a review of the historic situation remains
important whenever a federal court in equity is asked to apply state law.
This need to consult the historic distinctions between common law and equity
is not unique to the Erie question. In many ways, the problem here is similar to
that which courts face under the seventh amendment to the Constitution. That
amendment "preserves" a right to a jury in "suits at common law." The same
changes in federal procedure, together with the creation of new rights, have made
240. McClintock, supra note 91, at 52.
241. The hypothesized case could have been heard in equity if it involved the use of an equitable
procedural device such as the class action. In that case, however, the court's discretion would have
extended only to the joinder issues, not to the amount of damages.
242. The main impetus for this standardization has been the merger of common-law and equity in
most United States jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. In the majority of systems that have
merged law and equity, a single court may hear all claims and defenses that each party has against the
other, regardless of whether those claims were historically relegated to common law or equity. There
is accordingly little need today to differentiate between the legal and equitable causes of actions, as both
may be presented to the court in the unitary civil action.
Other changes have reduced the importance of the equitable procedural devices. Comprehensive
court rules like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state-law cousins have codified many of
the procedures that were historically available only in equity, and made them applicable to the unitary
civil action. Discovery is now widely available in all types of actions. Similarly, rules governing
joinder devices such as class action, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, and interpleader, Fed. R. Civ. P. 22, are codified
in written form.
These changes have had less of an impact on equitable remedies. Ofcourse, legislatures have been
busy in this area too, enacting detailed statutes regulating matters like injunctions and accounting.
Absent such a statute, however, courts still differentiate between legal and equitable relief in deciding
what remedy to provide. Even in a unitary civil action, a party seeking an equitable remedy must
demonstrate that its legal remedy is inadequate. Courts likewise retain considerable discretion in
determining whether to grant injunctions or receiverships. That courts still cling to these distinctions
between legal and equitable actions may explain why most modem efforts to distinguish law from
equity focus primarily on the remedy.
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possible suits that traditionally could have been prosecuted in neither common law
nor equity. Courts have struggled with finding the closest historic analogue4 and
carving up hybrid actions into their legal and equitable parts.2"
In the jury trial cases, the courts have erred in favor of concluding that
questions involve common-law issues, which results in the grant of a jury." s A
similar bias towards common law should apply to the equity exception to Erie. A
federal court hearing a state-law right must follow non-procedural state law except
on matters within the historic scope of equity. When a court is presented with a
modem hybrid case that includes both legal and equitable components, its first task
should be to separate the case into individual claims based on substantive law. If
a claim is historically equitable or highly analogous to something equity would
hear, it fits within the equity exception to Erie. If it is purely common law, of
course, the court should apply state law. Issues that fall into the historic domains
of neither common law nor equity should also be governed by state law. Because
Article III is a cession of power from the states to the federal judiciary, it should
be interpreted in light of what the states knowingly relinquished.
2. Congress's Power to Limit Federal Equity.
Congress exercises the legislative power, not the judicial. On the other hand,
Congress does have a unique role with respect to the judicial power of Article III.
Congress's explicit constitutional authority to create lower federal courts includes
the authority to parcel out to those courts all or only part of the judicial power
contained in Article Ill.6 Therefore, unlike the legislative and executive powers,
the judicial power of the lower federal courts is a potential, not an actual, power.
Congress's control over the judicial power has significant implications for the
equity exception. It means, for example, that Congress may limit a federal court's
discretion in equity, either by imposing additional requirements on the availability
of remedies or by preventing altogether the use of a given remedy. 7 No one
doubts that Congress has the power to control remedies in connection with rights
that it creates."' Through its control of the judicial power, however, Congress may
also control what remedies h federal court can grant in a state-law case, even if the
underlying substantive right falls outside Congress's legislative power." 9 As long
243. See, e.g., Chauffers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990), in which the
Court labored to find an historic analogue to a thoroughly modem federal statutory claim, a suit against
a labor union for breach of the duty of fair representation.
244. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500,. 79 S. Ct. 948 (1959).
245. Id. at 501, 79 S. Ct. at 948; Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,473,82 S. Ct. 894 (1962)
(jury trial even if equitable issues predominate).'
246. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
247. For examples of such limiting statutes, see supra note 224.
248. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 11 16(d)(4) (Supp. 1999) [as amended July 2, 1996] (limitations on
seizure orders under trademark laws); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1999) [as amended Oct. 27, 1992]
(limits remedies in most dilution suits to injunctions).
249. In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., the Supreme Court specifically upheld the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1994), which limits a federal court's ability to enjoin labor
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as Congress does not attempt to control the discretion thatstate courts may exercise
in those state-law cases, it has not exceeded its constitutional authority.
Conceivably, Congress could entirely prohibit a federal court from sitting in
equity in all cases arising under state law. Of course, the situation currently is just
the opposite, as federal courts have always enjoyed a broad equity jurisdiction in
diversity cases.2  Were Congress to change its mind, however, it could bar the use
of equitable discretion over state law claims by the simple expedient of taking
equity jurisdiction away from the lower federal courts. Withdrawing equity
jurisdiction would violate no constitutional norms. Although Congress cannot tell
the courts how to exercise judicial power in a given case,'. it need not give the
courts all the judicial power authorized by Article III. Congress could in theory
keep state-law cases completely out of the lower federal courts. If Congress can
remove state-law cases in their entirety, it certainly can confine the lower federal
courts to common-law jurisdiction. Moreover, although some have suggested that
there are unstated separation-of-powers limits on Congress's power to deny some
aspects of the judicial power to federal courts, 5' removing equity jurisdiction with
respect to state-law claims does not raise any serious separation of powers
concerns. Therefore, a federal court hearing either a federal statutory claim or a
state-law claim is obliged to heed any restrictions on its equitable discretion
imposed by Congress."3
B. Applying the Exception to Specific Rules of Equity in Cases Involving Non-
Federal Claims
Part III of this article demonstrated that there are actually two distinct equity
exceptions to Erie. First, in cases arising under a federal statute a federal court has
a delegated authority to fill in any gaps in the statute with judge-made rules.
Determining whether a gap-filling rule is valid is entirely a question of Congress's
intent, which may vary depending on the federal statute involved. Second, in all
cases a federal court that has been presented with a claim in equity has the inherent
authority to apply the historic rules of equity, provided it respects the underlying
disputes, stating, "[t]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States." 303 U.S. 323,330,58 S. Ct. 578 (1938).
250. Diversity jurisdiction in equity was granted in Section I I of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
has continued to this day, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. 1999).
251. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1972); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U.S. 211, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
252. See. e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 205 (3d ed. 1999); Martin Redish &Curtis
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 102-09 (1975); Gordon G. Young, A Critical
Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress 'ss Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower
Federal Courts, 54 Maryland L Rev. 132 (1995).
253. Of course, those restrictions must not violate any other constitutional limitations. A




substantive right. Determining the validity of judge-made law under this second,
and more controversial, exception is a trickier matter.
The notion that federal rules of equity cannot encroach on substantive rights
sounds much like the language used in the Supreme Court cases dealing with a
federal court's power to regulate procedure. And in fact both areas of federal
judge-made law stem from the Article III judicial power. Notwithstanding this
common origin, however, equity rules and procedural rules should not be measured
by the same yardstick. Equity is a separate exception to Erie, not a subset of the
procedural exception. The considerations underlying each differ significantly.
Rules of procedure should focus on fair and efficient adjudication, not on the
ultimate outcome of the case. Equity, by contrast, focuses primarily on how rights
are enforced. Given that the essence of equity is flexibility in remedy, it is highly
likely that two courts exercising their discretion could reach different outcomes.
That difference in outcome may well cause forum shopping by a plaintiff who
desires a certain outcome, or by a defendant who especially wants to avoid that
outcome." 4 Because a federal court can honor a state-law right even if it enforces
it with a different remedy than state law would allow, the validity of an equity rule
should not be gauged by the outcome/forum shopping test developed by the
Supreme Court in York, Hanna, and other cases.
A better test for equitable rules is the right/remedy distinction formulated in
the early Supreme Court cases. That rule requires a federal court in equity to defer
to other sovereign authority with respect to the basic legal rights and duties of the
parties. A federal court cannot enforce rights that do not exist in any state court,
even if that right would have been recognized in historic equity. Conversely, any
application of federal judge-made law that leads a federal court to destroy a state-
law right exceeds the court's authority. As long as it does not completely terminate
the right, however, the federal court has considerable discretion, subject only to
Congress and federal-court precedent, to determine how best to enforce that
existing state-law right.2"
Logically, providing a remedy where no substantive right exists and refusing
to grant a remedy for a clearly-established right are opposite sides of the same coin.
However, because of the procedural rules used in federal court practice, the
analysis of the two situations turns out to be very different. It is therefore useful
to deal with each situation separately.
254. Because they make the initial choice of forum, plaintiffs have a much greater ability to shop
for a forum than defendants. Defendants who are sued in federal court cannot transfer the case to state
court, although a few may be able to convince the federal court to abstain. And although 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (1948) allows defendants sued in state court to remove the case to federal court, that provision
contains certain restrictions, such as the § 1441(b) limitation on "home state" removal in diversity
cases, that limits its use.
'255. Actually, the proposed test for federal rules of equity is conceptually similar to the analysis
set forth in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136 (1965) for evaluating rules of procedure
promulgated in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). The Rules Enabling
Act authorizes only those rules that do "not abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right." In the same
vein, a rule of equity cannot create or abolish the underlying right, but can make existing rights more
or less effective by providing different means of enforcement.
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1. Federal Equity's Power to Grant Relief When a State Court Would
Deny It
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York" itself falls into this category. In York, a federal
court invoked its special powers of equity to grant relief on a claim that the state
court, relying on the state statute of limitations, would have dismissed outright.
Even though the Supreme Court discussed an equity exception to Erie at length, its
actual holding ordered the lower federal court to apply the state statuteY'7 Were it
to ignore that state-law limitations period, the federal court would in essence have
created a right where none existed under state law.
However, the holding in York does not always bar a federal court in equity
from granting a remedy that a party could not obtain in state court. York was a
special case. The state statute of limitations in that case did not simply bar a
particular remedy, but purported to foreclose all relief, legal or equitable, in any
court.25' In essence, expiration of the limitations period effectively terminated all
underlying rights that may have existed.
a. State Law Precludes All Relief
Therefore, York stands only for a narrow, and, under the analysis set forth in
this article, a somewhat obvious proposition: a federal court's discretion in equity
does not include the power to create new substantive rights. There are two basic
types of cases in which a federal equity rule will have this effect. The first
comprises situations similar to York, where a state court would have recognized a
right, but has for some reason declared that that right does not exist in this sort of
case. In addition to statutes of limitations, state-law rules such as immunities must
be applied in federal equity.259
The second situation is a case where a party asserts a substantive right
recognizable only in equity. If the state, either through its legislature or its courts,
has modified or abandoned an historically equitable substantive right, the federal
court must dismiss any claim or defense based upon that right. Although the
English system afforded equity the discretion to create such rights, federal courts
after Erie do not have that substantive lawmaking authority. Therefore, the federal
court must look to state law to ascertain whether these substantive rights exist.
256. 326 U.S. 99,65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945).
257. Id. at 112, 65 S. Ct. at 1471.
258. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the state statute actually applied in equity. Id. at
10 1, 65 S. Ct. at 1465. After determining that state law governed, the Court remanded the case for the
lower court to interpret state law. Id. at 112, 65 S. Ct. at 1471.
259. The reference to immunities in the text is meant to include only substantive state-law
immunities. If a state limits certain actions to a specific state court, thereby proving a defendant a sort
ofjurisdictional immunity in any other court, that rule would be a matter ofjurisdiction that would not
bind the federal courts, regardless of whether the federal court sat in law or equity.
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b. State Law Precludes All Equitable Remedies, But Allows Other
Relief
In many cases a party with a clearly-established legal right will nevertheless
be precluded from obtaining equitable relief in state court. Equity may shut its
doors because of the claimant's own acts or omissions, or because equity cannot
hear cases in which there is an adequate remedy at common law. In either
situation, the state has limited, but not entirely rejected, the underlying substantive
right. Because the substantive right still exists, a federal court in equity has the
discretion to enforce it as it sees fit in all but a handful of cases.
i. Equitable Defenses
Courts of equity have traditionally refused to aid claimants who were guilty of
improper behavior. This basic principle is reflected in the equitable defenses of
laches and unclean hands." As an important part of the English tradition, these
equitable defenses were preserved in the North American colonies. Over the years,
however, several states have modified some of the rules governing equitable
defenses, raising potential Erie concerns.
For purposes of Erie, most defenses are part and parcel of a substantive right.
For example, if a defendant in a breach of contract case proves that the statute of
frauds is not satisfied, the court will dismiss the plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
In essence, successful imposition of the defense negates the substantive right to
recover under that contract. Therefore, a federal court hearing that contract case
would be Erie-bound to follow the state rule governing the statute of frauds.
Most courts apparently assume that the same logic applies to equitable
defenses. As noted above,2"' a clear majority of federal courts hearing a state-law
claim look to state law to determine whether the defendant can prevail on a laches
or unclean hands defense. If state law defines the basic right, the argument goes,
it should also define when that right is lost because of the conduct of the plaintiff.
But that reasoning is too simplistic. Laches and unclean hands are fundamen-
tally different than other defenses. Unlike the statute of frauds defense, a
defendant may assert laches or unclean hands as a defense only when the plaintiff
seeks equitable relief. More importantly, a finding of laches or unclean hands
negates only the plaintiff's right to equitable relief.6 ' That plaintiff may still
260. Of course, laches and unclean hands are not the only defenses available to a defendant in
equity. However, these defenses are the only two that are unique to equitable claims. Other defenses
based on the conduct of the claimant, such as waiver, contributory negligence, and election of remedies,
were historically available in both common law and equity.
Estoppel is a more complex case. Although common law and equity would both bar claims based
on estoppel, the doctrines in the two systems originally differed in significant ways. Today, however,
common-law estoppel is largely indistinguishable from equitable. McClintock, supra note 91, at 80.
261. See supra note 126.
262. The rule that equitable defenses bar only equitable claims is not universally followed. For
example, federal courts have for many years allowed the defense of laches in suits seeking damages
under the patent and trademark acts. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020
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recover at common law against the defendant under the contract, although its
recovery will be limited to damages. 63 Because the plaintiff may still recover, the
equitable defense does not take away the underlying substantive contract right. An
equitable defense, then, is more akin to a bar to certain types of relief than it is to
a true defense.
This difference between true defenses and laches and unclean hands is crucial
for purposes of the equity exception to Erie. The majority of federal courts that
look to state law dealing with laches and unclean hands are in most cases deferring
unnecessarily to state law. Unlike true defenses, the existence of a state-law
equitable defense will rarely prevent a federal court from granting equitable relief
in a case. As long as the state would still provide some relief on the substantive
right, " the federal court is free to apply federal precedent in determining whether
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (patent); Brittingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1990), reh 'gdenied, 1990 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15977 (trademark); Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.
1990), reh 'g denied, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15192, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1991)
(patent). The rationale for allowing the defense may be that damages in these cases are largely
restitutionary in nature.
Moreover, there is some indication that the historic rule is changing. Some federal courts and many
states have interpreted the merger of law and equity as authorizing a party to use equitable defenses
against traditionally common-law claims. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Cal.
1996); Massey v. Jackson, 726 So. 2d 656,659 (Ala. App. 1998); Kerin v. Udolf, 334 A.2d 434,437
(Conn. 1973); PMI Mortgage Ins. Co. v. Cavendar, 615 So. 2d 710,712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831. 835 (Kan. App. 1981); Grigg v. Furniture Co., 260 N.W.2d 898, 903
(Mich. App. 1977); see generally 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 150, at 627 (1996) ("laches increasingly
is applied to actions at law").
Most courts, however, continue to observe the traditional distinctions. Ashley v. Boyle's Famous
Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1995); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Leaders,
818 F.2d 655,658 (8th Cir. 1987) (Iowa law); Kellermyer v. Blue Flame Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 983,985
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cer. denied, 479 U.S. 985, 107 S. Ct. 575 (1986); Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
794 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986) (Texas law); Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474,
478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919, 101 S. Ct. 316 (1980); Middleton Enters. v. Churm, 618 F.
Supp. 477, 479 n.1 (D. Mo. 1985); Gudenau v. Bang, 781 P.2d 1357, 1363 (Alaska 1989); County of
Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra, 612 P.2d 24, 31 (Cal. 1980); Davenport Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n v.
Hospital Ser., 154 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Iowa 1967); Smith v. Gehring, 496 A.2d 317, 323 (Md. 1985);
Strickland v. Cousens Realty, 484 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Me. 1984); Marvin E. Neiberg Real Estate Co. v.
Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Mo. App. 1993); City-Wide Asphalt Paving, Inc.
v. Alamance County, 513 S.E.2d 335,338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State
Land Bd., 439 P.2d 575, 577 (Or. 1968); Fremont Homes, Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 959 (Wyo.
1999); see generally Dobbs, supra note 59, at 68 ("The most orthodox view of the unclean hands
doctrine makes it an equitable defense.., but not one that defeats other remedies."), 76 ("Courts have
routinely referred to laches as an equitable defense, that is, a defense to equitable remedies but not a
defense available to bar a claim of legal relief."); cf Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226,244 n. 16, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1256 n.16 (1985) ("application of the equitable defense of laches in an
action at law would be novel indeed," language is dictum). The discussion in the text assumes that the
majority rule prevails.
263. Although laches itself was available only with respect to claims for equitable relief, the same
behavior might also give rise to a common-law defense such as estoppel or waiver. Dobbs, supra note
59, at 76. Therefore, a party guilty of laches will not necessarily be able to recover damages.
264. A federal court adjudicating a state-law claim must make an Initial reference to state law to
determine if laches and unclean hands are "complete" defenses that may be used against both legal and
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the defense is available, even if the result is to allow the claimant to proceed in
equity. Although the outcome may differ, that difference is well within the
flexibility that Article il1 and Congress granted to the federal courts in equity.
The only situation in which a state equitable bar would apply is when the state
courts would allow only equitable relief on that claim. This situation could arise,
for example, in connection with a cause of action that could traditionally be heard
only in equity, such as a suit against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty. If the
state would dismiss the suit because of an equitable bar, it has for all practical
purposes declared that the party has no judicially-enforceable substantive right.
Therefore, if the federal court were to ignore the state-law bar and grant any relief
whatsoever, it would exceed its judicial power by creating a new cause of action.
Aside from that rare case, however, a federal court need not apply unusual state-
law rules governing equitable defenses.
ii. Adequacy of the Remedy at Common Law
The historic notion that a court of equity would refuse to hear a case in which
the claimant could obtain full and complete relief at common law was explicitly
preserved in the first Judiciary Act.26 Vagaries in state practice, however, caused
problems for the federal courts from a very early date. Some states maintained no
courts of equity. Others allocated cases between law and equity in ways different
than the English courts. Faced with these problems, the Supreme Court quickly
established that adequacy in federal courts of equity was a purely federal issue. In
determining whether it could proceed, a. federal court of equity was required to
consider only those common-law claims recognized by the federal courts, not state
law.2" Thus, a federal court could proceed in equity notwithstanding that the state
had created a new remedy or procedure that was available in its common-law
courts," or even if the state did not maintain courts of equity."' Conversely, a
federal court was supposed to deny a remedy if an adequate remedy existed in
equitable claims. If the state law treats it as a complete bar, and the federal standard for laches or
unclean hands is the same as the state, a federal court that ignored the defense would in effect be
creating a substantive right.
265. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 16, ch. 20, I Stat. 82 (1789).
266. American Fed. of Labor Metal Trades Dep't v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 761 (1946);
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280,60 S. Ct. 527 (1940); Atlas L Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S.
563.59 S. Ct. 657 (1939); Petroleum Exploration v. Public Ser. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 58 S. Ct. 834(1938); DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Assoc., 296 U.S. 64, 56S. Ct. 1 (1935); Risty v. Chicago, RI
& P. R. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 46 S. Ct. 236(1926); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898);
McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201,7 S. Ct. 940 (1887); Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (I I How.)
669 (1850); United States v. King, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 833 (1849).
267. McConihay, 121 U.S. 201, 7 S. Ct. 940; Smyth, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. CL 418; Sheffield
Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 574,13 S. Ct. 936 (1893); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202,
14 S. Ct. 75 (1893); but see Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521,52 S. Ct. 217 (1932) and Stratton v.
St. Louis S.W.R. Co., 284 U.S. 530, 52 S. Ct. 222 (1932).
268. Bennett, 52 U.S. (I I How.) 669; King, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 833.
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federal common law, even if the state courts would allow the party to proceed in
equity.
269
This complete disregard of state practice must be tempered in light of Erie.
The problem with the approach of these early cases is not that Erie somehow limits
the discretion that Article III allows a federal court in equity. Rather, the problem
is that Erie effectively destroys that body of federal common law to which the
federal courts in equity had looked for an adequate legal remedy. Today, unless the
issue is governed by a federal statute or treaty, the Constitution, or one of the
narrow categories of federal substantive judge-made law, state law alone defines
whether one party has a legal claim against another. If a party presents that claim
to a federal court, Erie requires the federal court to administer the state-law right
in the same way a state court would administer it. Therefore, a federal court today
must survey state law to determine what sorts of claims are alternatives to the
equitable remedy sought by the claimant.""°
But Erie does not require a wholesale adoption of state rules governing
adequacy of the legal remedy. First, although state law provides the list of
available actions, whether the state labels those actions as common-law or equitable
is not binding on the federal court. Because equity will enforce newly-created
substantive rights, a federal court could well deem a novel state-law cause of action
equitable notwithstanding that the state labeled it a common-law action. Second,
even if a federal court considers a particular state-law action to be at common law,
federal law rather than state determines whether that remedy is a complete and
adequate alternative to the equitable relief. If a federal court ascertains that a state
common-law legal remedy is deficient in one or more respects, it should be free to
exercise its judicial power to craft a more suitable remedy, even if the state
considers its common-law remedy fully adequate. Thus, although a federal court
must look to state law for the common-law alternatives, whether a particular
alternative is adequate is a federal issue.
c. State Law Precludes One, But Not All, Equitable Remedies
If a federal court may grant an injunction when a state court would give only
damages, it stands to reason that a federal court could also grant that injunction
when a state court would afford only another type of equitable relief. After all, in
this situation the state agrees that the case is appropriate for use of the discretionary
powers of equity. Nevertheless, as the rules that bar particular equitable remedies
are different than those used to bar all equitable relief, a brief analysis of this
situation is useful.
269. Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314,115 S. Ct. 129 (1894); United States v. Wilson, 118 U.S.
86, 6 S. Ct. 991 (1886); Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U.S. (19 Otto) 378 (1878).
270. Of course, not all state-law remedies are available in a federal court. For example, ifa state
gives an administrative agency the authority to oversee certain matters, that administrative remedy can
be obtained only from the state. If a federal court has no power to provide a state-law remedy, the
existence of that remedy ought not preclude a federal court from affording equitable relief.
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i. Choice of Remedy
A state court might refuse a certain remedy in a particular case because it finds
another equitable remedy better suited to the facts of that case. That decision could
simply be an ad hoc determination by a judge, or could be guided by state-court
precedent that declares that certain remedies are never available in given cases,
such as the commonplace rule that a court will not issue a mandatory injunction to
enforce a personal services contract. In either situation, the federal court is free to
ignore state practice and grant the remedy. The state clearly recognizes the
substantive right. As the federal judicial power in equity includes the authority to
select the most appropriate remedy to enforce that right, a federal court may
exercise that discretion without considering the state's opinion as to how a case
should be resolved.27 1
ii. Elements of a Particular Remedy
A state may also refuse to grant a particular remedy because it has established
certain standards for use of that remedy. Such state-law limitations on a remedy
should rarely, if ever, be binding on a federal court. Regardless of whether the
limit is imposed by case law, the state legislature, or even the state constitution,72
that limit simply represents the state's view as to whether that particular remedy is
appropriate. The Article III judicial power, however, gives the federal courts an
independent authority to make that same determination. If a federal court decides
that the remedy is appropriate, whether that decision is based on federal precedent
or upon the court's evaluation of the facts of the case, it is not bound by the state
law to the contrary.
The only situation in which Erie might require a federal court to honor state-
created elements for a particular remedy is where that remedy is inextricably
intertwined with the underlying substantive right. It is possible, for example, that
a right could be effective only if it is enforced by injunction. If a federal court
would grant an injunction in a case where a state court would deny it, the federal
court would in effect be creating a new right. However, true right/remedy mergers
are exceedingly rare. Accordingly, a federal court in the vast majority of cases will
be able to grant equitable remedies even if state law limits the availability of that
remedy in state court.
271. Conceivably, however, a state might limit the remedies available for given claim so
significantly that it has for all intents and purposes abolished the underlying right. For
example, if a state allowed only the imposition of a constructive trust in defamation cases,
the right to sue for defamation would be largely illusory. When the state has effectively
abolished the underlying right, a federal court is bound to deny all remedies that would honor
that right in any way.
272. For example, a state might prohibit its courts from enjoining speech based upon a provision
in the state constitution.
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iii. Limits on a Remedy Imposed by a State Legislature
At times, state legislatures will limit equitable relief. Many states, for
example, will not enjoin violations of covenants not to compete.2 " These
legislative limitations should rarely apply in federal litigation. Of course, the limits
reflect important state policy concerns involving the underlying right. A federal
court should certainly acknowledge these concerns, and consider them when
deciding whether to grant the requested remedy. Nevertheless, the federal court is
not bound by the state determination, and may grant the remedy if it finds it
appropriate.
Another way in which a state legislature may limit equity is to create a new
right, but authorize only one or two remedies for enforcing that right. A state
legislature does, of course, retain the sole authority to define substantive rights as
it sees fit. Any restrictions on the right itself must be honored by the federal court,
including who may bring an action to enforce the right, the damages that may be
recovered, and how long the right lasts. But a federal court is usually not bound
by a state legislature's attempt to cut off certain available remedies. If a federal
court considers an accounting to be the most effective way to enforce that right, it
may grant that remedy even though the state legislature limited the remedy to
damages. Once again, the only exception is where the legislature has limited the
remedy so greatly that it has in effect rendered the underlying right a nullity or
fundamentally changed its character. Although these situations involving a right-
remedy merger may be more common in the case of legislatively-imposed limits,
they still make up only a small percentage of cases.
In short, then, Erie requires a federal court in equity to apply a state law
denying recovery only when the state either does not recognize the right at all, or
when it has foreclosed all effective remedies for that right. In these situations, for
a federal court to grant any remedy would create a new substantive right enforce-
able only in federal court, an act that falls without the judicial power of Article III.
However, as long as the state allows any effective remedy, legal or equitable, for
a substantive right, the federal court may grant whatever equitable remedy it
chooses.
2. Federal Equity's Power to Deny Relief When a State Court Would
Grant It
Although this situation appears to be merely the converse of that discussed in
the prior section, subtle differences in court procedure require a separate analysis.
Procedural rules were not a great concern in the earlier discussion. A federal court
that grants equitable relief where a state court would deny all relief has certainly
"created" a new substantive right. A federal court that denies relief when a state
273. See. e.g., Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988) (California statute
prevented a preliminary injunction).
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court would grant it, however, has not necessarily refused to recognize the
substantive right. As long as the claimant may still enforce the right in some other
way, the federal court's refusal to grant the remedy does not destroy the underlying
legal relationship created by the state.
a. Federal Limits on Particular Remedies
Federal rules dealing with specific equitable remedies are the easiest case. For
example, a federal court's decision not to grant an injunction where such relief
would be against the public interest is clearly within the Article III judicial power.
Although the court might deny the injunction, it would still grant damages or other
appropriate common-law relief. Therefore, as the federal court has in fact enforced
the underlying legal right, albeit not as fully or effectively as the plaintiff had
hoped, it has not engaged in the sort of substantive lawmaking condemned by Erie.
As before, a few cases may involve a right/remedy merger, where the
underlying right can be effectively enforced in only one particular way. Denying
that remedy would be akin to rejecting the underlying right, which the federal court
cannot do. Although several federal courts have found a right/remedy merger in
cases of this sort,"' all involved a request for a preliminary injunction, which as
discussed above is a unique situation.2" The only other case in which a federal
court might find a merger is where the state recognizes a novel remedy such as an
apology or a declaratory judgment, and no other relief effectively vindicates the
right.
b. Federal Rules Barring All Equitable Relief
The Supreme Court's Quackenbush decision, discussed above,76 establishes
that a federal court in equity may invoke policy considerations to refuse to hear
state-law rights, regardless of whether those policy considerations would matter to
a state court. That decision is entirely consistent with the thesis of this article. A
grant of equity jurisdiction is a grant of discretion to determine how rights should
be enforced. Historically, that discretion included the right to deny any equitable
remedy if the circumstances so warranted. The English courts reduced some of
these discretionary factors to rules, which today constitute the equitable defenses.
274. See, e.g., Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745,753 (E.D.N.Y.
1966) (technically dictum, as federal law was identical); Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 931 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th
Cir. 197 1). Note that neither of the cases actually dealt with a situation where federal precedent held
that the remedy should be denied.
275. Courts grant preliminary injunctions in order to reduce or prevent the harm that litigants may
suffer before the lawsuit can be resolved. In essence, then, the preliminary injunction creates a
substantive right to preserve the status quo for the pendency of the lawsuit. Because no other remedy
really accomplishes that goal, the preliminary injunction may be one of those rare cases in which the
right and remedy merge.
276. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996), is discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 227 to 229.
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Regardless of whether it is based on case-by-case discretion or an established
equitable defense, however, a federal court's refusal to grant equitable relief does
not mean that the court has rejected the claimant's substantive right, but merely
limits the claimant to a common-law remedy. "
i. Equitable Defenses
Contrary to the clear majority rule,27' a federal court should be free to deny
equitable relief based upon laches or unclean hands regardless of whether that
defense would apply in a state proceeding. Equitable defenses focus on whether
it is fair to allow a party who has misbehaved to invoke the extraordinary powers
of equity. The penalty for misbehavior is not loss of the substantive right, but only
the denial of any equitable relief."9 Therefore, except in the rare case of a
right/remedy merger, Erie does not apply to federal equitable defenses.
The result is the same even if the state legislature abrogates one of the
defenses. A statute of limitations, for example, is often interpreted as supplanting
the equitable defense of laches.280 Nevertheless, a federal court is free to deny
equitable reliefbased on laches even if the applicable state statute of limitations has
not yet expired. Because a decision to apply laches is a decision to refuse the
plaintiff access to equitable discretion, it is a jurisdictional matter governed by
federal instead of state law.2 '
ii. Adequacy
Federal instead of state law likewise controls whether the common-law relief
is full and adequate. As with equitable defenses, a determination of adequacy
277. In systems that operate separate common-law and equity courts, a court of equity would
dismiss the case if it found unclean hands or laches. As discussed supra in note 218, that dismissal did
not preclude the plaintiff from filing again in common law. In a modern unified system like the modem
federal courts, a court that finds laches or unclean hands will not dismiss the action, but will instead
deny all equitable relief. Even if the plaintiff has requested only equitable remedies, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(c) allows the court to grant whatever relief it deems appropriate.
Ofcourse, a federal court invoking an equitable defense must still provide some form of relief. Even
abstention does not necessarily deprive the claimant of a forum. Quackenbush allows a federal court
to abstain only when presented with a claim for discretionary relief. Thus, if a party has suffered an
injury compensable by damages, a federal court may nevertheless be required to hear the case.
278. See supra note 126.
279. As discussed supra in note 262, some states allow laches and unclean hands to be asserted
in all cases, not just in equity. Supra note 264 discusses how a federal court should deal with a case
under the law of one of those states.
280. Dobbs, supra note 59, at 77-78.
281. In fact, federal courts will typically not dismiss an equitable claim based on laches if that
claim is governed by a statute of limitations that has not expired. Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned
Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 169 (8th Cir. 1995) (federal law); FDIC v. Fuller, 994 F.2d 223,224 (5th Cir.
1993) (state law); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1109, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994). The argument in the text merely demonstrates that they would be
free to invoke the equitable defense in such a case.
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merely limits the claimant to damages or other common-law relief. 82 Moreover,
unlike many of the other rules discussed in this section, there will never be a case
where a federal court's determination of adequacy runs afoul of the problem with
right/remedy merger. If the federal court has determined that damages or other
common-law relief is adequate, then the underlying substantive right is being fully
vindicated.
c. Federal Law Precludes All Relief
Just as a federal court in equity cannot create new substantive rights, it is
powerless to destroy rights that a state has created. However, a federal court does
not necessarily destroy a right merely because it refuses to provide any relief to a
claimant. For example, consider a federal court faced with a new and unique state-
law cause of action that is equitable in nature. Because that cause of action was not
one historically recognized by equity, a federal court applying federal precedent
might be inclined not to recognize it. The court would probably dispose of the case
by granting a dismissal under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(b). Whether that
dismissal terminates the substantive right turns on whether the claimant is barred
by res judicata from presenting the same claim to another court. Although a
12(b)(6) dismissal ordinarily does bar relitigation, the court can specify that the
dismissal is "without prejudice."2 3 Therefore, a federal court conceivably could
refuse to provide any relief on a claim without actually affecting the claimant's
substantive rights.
However, a federal court should not be able to shirk its duties under Erie in
this fashion. The essence of Erie is that federal courts must defer to Congress and
the state for the substantive law.2 Congress has further made the federal courts
282. The argument in favor of applying federal law on the question of adequacy may actually be
even more compelling than the argument for equitable defenses. There is a strong jurisdictional flavor
to the issue ofadequacy. Traditionally, the adequacy determination controlled whether the equity courts
could even hear the case. Although there were no separate federal equity courts, Congress also
specifically drew the line between the common-law and equity sides of the federal courts based upon
the standard used in the English courts. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 16, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 82 (1789). Because
Congress has exclusive control over federal jurisdiction, where a state happens to draw the line between
common-law and equity is irrelevant.
283. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The Supreme Court has interpreted 4 1(b) literally, holding that 12(bX6)
dismissals are with prejudice unless the judge specifies otherwise. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3, 101 S. Ct. 2424,2428 n.3 (1981).
284. Not all equitable causes of action involve substantive rights. Equity also recognized several
auxiliary causes of action, such as the bill of discovery, a creditor's suit to help collect a judgment,
receivership, and the suit to reopen a judgment for fraud upon the court. See generally McClintock,
supra note 91, at 547-60. Most of these auxiliary actions have been supplanted by statute or court rules,
and therefore are no longer a real issue. A few, however, remain in force in some states, especially the
independent action to set aside a judgment. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which recognizes the possible
existence of the action to set aside a judgment.
Federal courts should not be required to hear a case in which a party asserts an auxiliary equitable
right that is not otherwise available in federal court, even if it results in the federal court dismissing the
proceeding. Although these equitable actions create new legal rights, those rights exist only as an
adjunct to an existing cause of action that involves a substantive legal rule. Therefore, the only right
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available for hearing state-law claims between diverse parties. For a federal court
to dismiss a case without prejudice based on the fact that the underlying substantive
right did not exist in English equity, thereby forcing the claimant to protect her
rights in state court, violates the essence of Erie and the explicit command of
Congress." 5 Congress did not intend for its grant of equitable discretion in the
diversity statute to include the discretion to refuse all enforcement of valid state-
law rights. Therefore, a federal court must grant some effective remedy, although
not necessarily an equitable remedy, for all state-law equitable causes of action.186
In conclusion, although the two situations arise in different contexts and
involve different considerations, a federal court's power to deny relief when sitting
in equity is roughly the mirror image of its power to grant relief. A federal court
must defer to the state on the issue of whether a substantive right exists. 87 If no
right exists, the federal court cannot grant any relief whatsoever. If a right does
exist, however, a federal court asked to provide equitable relief has broad authority
to enforce that right by applying federal judge-made law. As long as the court
affords some effective remedy, it has satisfied the requirements of Erie. Because
the Constitution gives the federal courts considerable discretion when acting in
equity, they have the authority to reach an outcome different from the likely result
in state court.
V. CONCLUSION
The actual holding of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York does not immediately square
with some of the language found in the majority opinion. Although the Court held
that Erie required a federal court to apply the particular state law in question, the
majority argued that Erie applied differently in equity than it did in common law.
Because the Court did not explain why equity enjoyed this special status, that
dictum has led to some confusion in the lower courts.
This article has demonstrated that the basic premise of the York dictum is
correct. There are, in fact, two distinct "equity exceptions" to Erie. The first is
that a federal court's power to "fill in the gaps" in a federal statute by creating a
body of auxiliary rules includes the authority to apply a federal law of equity,
created by a state-law auxiliary cause of action is the right to have that underlying substantive right
enforced in a particular way. A state law that purports to dictate how a right should be enforced in
federal court contradicts the Article Ill judicial power, which gives to the federal courts a wide latitude
to enforce that basic right as it sees fit. Thus, Erie requires federal courts to apply only those state-law
equitable causes of action that create new and independent substantive rights, not any auxiliary causes
of action.
285. A federal court in this situation may stillrefuse to hear a case for reasons other than the nature
of the underlying claim, such asforum non conventens or abstention.
286. Of course, there may be other reasons why a federal court is precluded from hearing the claim.
The eleventh amendment to the Constitution, for example, prevents a federal court from hearing state-
law claims against state defendants.
287. If Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, either creates a new right or abolishes
a state-law right, the federal court must of course defer to Congress.
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derived from historical principles of equity. As a federal court's general gap-filling
power is already widely recognized, this first exception is largely undisputed.
The second exception is both broader in scope and more controversial. A
federal court in equity has considerable power to diverge from state law on matters
pertaining to how a right should be enforced. The federal courts derive that
authority from the Article III judicial power. By extending the judicial power to
include cases in equity, the framers contemplated that federal courts would
continue to exercise the sorts of discretion that characterized English Chancery.
Although that discretion does not allow the federal courts to create or destroy
substantive rights, it does give them considerable flexibility when dealing with
rights created by either Congress or the states. In most instances, federal courts
have the authority to apply their own rules governing remedies, equitable defenses,
and whether the remedy at common law is adequate.
Of course, this article is not intended to be the last word on the equity
exception to Erie. Equity is largely an historical accident, which produced a system
that includes many widely-varying rules. Courts and commentators must continue
to explore how Erie applies to each of the myriad rules that form up this law of
equity. Although this article merely scratches the surface, use of the general
principles set out above should help guide the courts and commentators in their
task.
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